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The Parallel Worlds of Corporate Governance
and Labor Law

PEER ZUMBANSEN*

ABSTRACT

This paperengages the concept of transnationallaw (TL) in a way that goes beyond the by now accustomed usages with regardto the development of legal norms and
the observation of legalaction across nation-stateboundaries, involving both state and
nonstateactors. The concept of TL can serve to illustratea much further-reachingset
of developments in norm creationand legal regulation. TL is here understoodnot only
as a body oflegal norms, but it is also employed as a methodologicalapproach to illustrate common and sharedchallenges and responses to legal regulatory systems worldwide. In the case ofcorporategovernance, TL captures the specific regulatory mix of
formal, hard,public regulation,on the one hand,and of informal, soft, private regulation, on the othe; that characterizesthe contemporaryevolution ofcorporategovernance norms. Corporategovernance norms give testimony of an ongoing searchfor
answers to persisting problems in the organization of the firm, the distribution of
power between shareholders,stakeholders,and the firm, as well as the responsibilityof
the corporation to its environment while-at the same time-reflecting on fundamental changes ofthe natureof norm creation and legal interpretation.While this approach is likely already to undermine some of the contentions regardinga universal
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convergence of corporategovernance systems towards an outsider-control,shareholdervalue-maximization model at the "endof history ofcorporatelaw," its risks lie in the
misappropriationof the describedprocesses ofprivate orderingas processes of natural
evolution. After all, the shift away fiom formal law making to processes of societal
self-regulation-asreflected in the rise of corporategovernance codes, standards, best
practiceso1; in the area of laborlaw, of codes of conduct and core labor rights-might
turn out to be a lessfortunateanswer to the redistributiveandparticipatoryquestions
that are posed when one views corporategovernance in the context of a largerset of
welfare state norms, comprisingnot only company law and securitiesregulation, but
also labor andemployment law, industrialrelations,and insolvency law. Eventually,
a careful study of the transformation of the process of law making and rule
enforcement suggests the necessity of taking a broader view on corporate governance
than is often the case. Seen againstthe backgroundof a globalization of economic activity, capitalflows, and the erosion of many protective norms and rights-inparticular in the area of labor law--the study of transnationalcorporategovernance can
contributeto a better understandingof the regulatory challengesof a globalizedmarket economy.
INTRODUCTION

The transterritorialization of company activities that span the globe-with
widespread subsidiaries, interfirm networks, and extreme forms of outsourcing
of formerly corporate-owned processes-challenges traditional regulatory aspirations of nation-states and other political bodies.' Corporate activity is disintegrated into a multitude of decentralized, and yet connected, processes. This state
reflects on the dramatic changes of the nature and structure of the private business corporation and of the marketplace in which it operates. With corporate activity encompassing the production of cars, tank ships, microchips, medical and
spaceflight software, precision weapons, and throw-away toys to help uninventive hosts of children's birthday parties, no end is in sight to a feverishly progressing diversification of products and methods for their branding, assembly, and

1. Peter Hertner, CorporateGovernanceand MultinationalEnterprise in HistoricalPerspective,in
COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH

41 (Klaus

J. Hopt et al. eds., 1998); see Mark Herkenrath & Volker Bornschier, TransnationalCorporationsin
World Development: Still the Same Harmful Effects in an Increasingly Globalized World Economy?, 9
J. WORLD-SYSTEMS RES. 105 (2003).
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dissemination.2 Dell, the computer firm, made use of the "three new freedoms"
in the 1990s-to conduct business without borders, to conduct business "unburdened by any sense of responsibility to any community or any individual," and to
conduct it in the wake of a technological revolution that allowed for an unprecedented extension of the assembly line 3-exemplifying a much larger trend,
whose sources and driving forces date to at least a century prior. The "Dell Effect" describes a computer manufacturing and sales unit that can custom assemble
and deliver computers anytime and anywhere in the world,4 that has dramatically cut down on inventory times and, much like Wal-Mart, integrated its thousands of business partners, suppliers, assemblers, and transporters in a
worldwide logistical web. It must today be seen to embody much of what
Manuel Castells rightly coined the "Network Society,"5 and what others refer to
as the "Digital Revolution." 6 The stories are no less than breathtaking:
As other companies struggled to reorganize their internal operations, to contract out more work, to blend in more overseas
sources of supply, [Michael] Dell focused on using the latest in
supply-chain management software to coordinate the movement
of components from wherever he could get them. Almost entirely
unrestrained by existing in-house component-manufacturing operations, Dell concentrated instead on developing a system that
could track individual items-no matter where they were
made-more tightly and efficiently than was possible even in the
most perfectly integrated of old-line companies. For Dell, manufacturing was not making things, it was buying and moving and

2. See generally NAOMI KLEIN, No LoGo: TAKING AIM
ed. 2001) (1999).
3. BARRY C. LYNN, END OF THE LINE: THE RISE AND

AT THE BRAND BULLIES

(1st Picador USA

FALL OF THE GLOBAL CORPORATION

103

(2005).
4. See DELL INC., THE DELL EFFECT: EXPANDING ACCESS AND CHANGING THE WORLD 1-2, http://
www.dell.com/downloads/global/corporate/delleffect/DellEffect.pdf; Dell Global Product
Development, http://www I .us.dell.com/content/topics/global.aspx/innovation/en/cto-productdevelopment?c=us&l=en&s=corp (detailing Dell's innovation centers in Texas, India, China, Taiwan, and Malaysia).
5. 1 MANUEL CASTELLS, THE INFORMATION AGE: ECONOMY, SOCIETY AND CULTURE: THE RISE OF
THE NETWORK SOCIETY (2d ed. 2000).

6.

JACK CHALLONER, THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION

(2002).
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assembling and delivering things that other companies had manufactured. 7
Michael Piore and Charles Sabel have identified the enormous social, economic, and political consequences of Taylorist scientific production forms,8 standardization of work tasks, and the construction of markets for mass consumer
goods through the technological revolution in the nineteenth century as the
"Second Industrial Divide."9 These phenomena seem mere precursors to
present developments, the impact of which we recognize as still more radical
and untamable than the former. While the welfare state arose"0 out of the dire
situation of rural desertion, urban poverty, and industrial workers' hardship,"
no such utopian model offers itself at the outset of the twenty-first century. With
the Western welfare state struggling to rediscover its institutional promise for
the future, 2 the answers to the regulatory challenges of globalized markets are
increasingly sought elsewhere.
In this new globally competitive economy, the exploited human
beings with whose dignity and welfare the founders of labour
laws were concerned, are now most likely to be found in sweat
shops in South Asia or the Caribbean producing clothes for supermarkets in Europe and America; or in slum factories in East Asia
3
assembling circuit boards for transnational IT companies.'

7. LYNN,supra note 3, at 102.
8. See MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE: POSSIBILITIES FOR
PROSPERITY 45-46 (1984). The term Taylorism goes back to the particular form of mass production
conceptualized in FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT
(1911).
9. PIORE & SABEL, SUpra note 8, at 6.

10. See Paul Pierson, The New Politics of the Welfare State, 48

WORLD POL.

143 (1996); Philip

Manow, Welfare State Building and CoordinatedCapitalismin Japanand Germany, in
OF NONLIBERAL CAPITALISM

THE ORIGINS

94, 95 (Wolfgang Streeck & Kozo Yamamura eds., 2001).

11. See generally KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
(2d ed., Beacon Press 2001) (1944); UPTON SINCLAIR, THE JUNGLE (Random

ORIGINS OF OUR TIME

House 2002) (1906) (providing an account of the bleak and violent conditions of workers in Chicago's stockyards in novel form).
12. See JORGEN HABERMAS, The New Obscurity:The Crisisof the Welfare State and the Exhaustion
of Utopian Energies, in THE NEW CONSERVATISM: CULTURAL CRITICISM AND THE HISTORIANS' DEBATE 48, 50-51,54, 59 (Shierry Weber Nicholsen ed. and trans., 1989).
13. BOB HEPPLE, LABOUR LAWS AND GLOBAL TRADE 5-6 (2005).
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The characterization of economic globalization as the worldwide interaction
of global trading partners is paralleled by an unprecedented economic interdependence of industry branches and their respective human and institutional
communities and stakeholders around the world. This interdependence results
from firms relying on the cheapest labor, on export-processing zones, and on justin-time delivery of elements from innumerable places and directions. 4 This
highly sensitive system of interlocking production and delivery processes constitutes an overwhelming challenge for traditional conceptions of business corporations, of their relations to business partners, and of stakeholders, such as
employees and the community in which a business operates. Underneath the shining layer of universally available standard goods, unrestrained by seasonal
changes or other local conditions, we find a pulsating network of fine arteries connecting a multitude of actors' lives, each delivered to this massive and sprawling
machinery. The "state as machine" 5 has seemingly found its master.
The focus of this paper is on the changes in legal regulation of transnational
corporate activity. The study of the structure of contemporary legal regulation is
rendered difficult through the proliferation of "spaces and places" of norm generation. 6 As a result, an exploration of the law applicable to domestic and global
corporate activity must trespass disciplinary boundaries, as the norms that corporations follow (or seek to escape) encompass corporate law rules, the rules of
taxation law and labor law, which together shape the regulatory environment of
the contemporary corporation. But, such exploration must also illuminate the
tension between the place of the business operation and the locally applied
norms ("place"), and the decentered reality of the corporation and the norms
that are emerging to address this delocalized phenomenon of corporate activity
("space"). While the political economy of domestic corporate and labor regulation is still characterized by contested traditions of institutional and political
heritage and disciplinary boundaries and power,17 the regulatory environment
14. See id. at 13-14.
15. HORST DREIER, HIERARCHISCHE

16. See generally SASKIA

VERWALTUNG IM DEMOKRATISCHEN STAAT

19-36 (1991).

SASSEN, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: ESSAYS ON THE NEW MO-

BILITY OF PEOPLE AND MONEY (1998). Cf.J. Rogers Hollingsworth, New Perspectiveson the Spatial
Dimensions ofEconomic Coordination:Tensions Between Globalizationand Social Systems ofProduction, 5 REV. oF INT'L POL. ECON. 482,487 (1998). See also Adelle Blackett, Global Governance, Legal
Pluralism and the DecenteredState: A Labor Law Critiqueof Codes of CorporateConduct, 8 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 401,403-04, 426 (2001); Peer Zumbansen, Spaces and Places:A Systems Theory
Approach to Regulatory Competition in European Company Law, 12 EUR. L. J. (forthcoming 2006).
17. See generally Kathleen Thelen, Varieties of Labor Politics in the Developed Democracies, in
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM 71 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds., 2001).
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of corporations and laborers operating on and for global markets increasingly
incorporates distinctly transnational elements. States or international organizations are not the sole authors of laws and binding norms."8 Domestic statutory
and case law (especially in the field of labor law) is complemented by a proliferation of "soft law," corporate governance codes, codes of conduct, best practice
guidelines, and standards. Meanwhile, domestic labor law programs and international labor law face the challenge and competition of transnational labor
norms, generated by both public and private norm authors that operate with
little regard to political and geographical borders. 9 This proliferation and hybridization of norms in the areas of labor law and corporate law raises multiple
questions as to the legal nature of these norms, their authorship, and their enforceability. In a brilliant analysis of this challenge, Adelle Blackett wrote in the
IndianaJournalof GlobalLegal Studies a few years ago:
Workers in EPZs [export processing zones] are thrust into the
post-modern system of just-in-time flexible accumulation as they
enter the deterritorialized legal order of the multinational enterprises, living and producing their norms. Yet, they do so in particular places that may harken back to the Dickensian conditions of
2
nineteenth-century industrialization.. 1
Underscoring the importance of an astute analysis of the place of regulation
against the background of the larger dimensions of economic and regulatory
spaces to open up the local framework, she notes later:

18. Niklas Luhmann, Die Weltgesellschaft, 57 ARCHIV FUR REeHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE
[ARSP] 1 (1971) (F.R.G.); See Gunther Teubner, Review Essay, Breaking Frames:The Global Interplay ofLegal and Social Systems, 45 AM. J. CoMp. L. 149, 149-50 (1997); Peer Zumbansen, Die vergangene Zukunft des V6lkerrechts, 34 Kritische Justiz [KJJ 46 (2001) (F.R.G.) (identifying the
absence of a hierarchy of norms in the global sphere).
19. See HEPPLE,supranote 13, at 69-87. See generally the discussion between Philip Alston and
Brian Langille on the viability of the ILO regime and the merits of core labor rights and standards: Philip Alston, 'Core Labour Standards' and the Tranformation of the InternationalLabour
Rights Regime, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 457 (2004) lhereinafter Alston, Core LabourStandards]; Brian A.
Langille, Core Labour Rights - The True Story (Reply to Alston), 16 EuR. J. INT'L L. 409 (2005);
Philip Alston, Facing up to the Complexities of the ILO's Core Labour Standards Agenda, 16 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 467 (2005) [hereinafter Alston, Facingup].
20. Blackett, supra note 16, at 405.
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[B]y explicitly considering the importance of place, corporate
codes can broaden the discussion of labor rights to address the frequent inability of developing countries and transition economies
to provide functional labor inspection and dispute resolution ser21
vices, not to mention suitable schools.
The need for such inquiry seems obvious given the evidence of the detrimental effect of deregulated labor markets on workers' conditions, employment
hours and protection, wage levels, and training.22 In light of the current state of
labor law regulation on the domestic and international level, attention has increasingly turned to transnational norms of labor regulation. 23 But, skepticism
rightly prevails regarding the quality of self-regulatory regimes as embodied in
24
corporate codes of conduct or core labor standards.
This calls for a comprehensive study and exploration of the conditions that
shape contemporary employment-within domestic markets as well as in developing countries and crucially delegalized export processing zones. Whether or
not a transnationallabor regime will deliver in the hopes for a better and more effective protection of the rights of workers in today's global economy depends to
a large degree on its concrete legal structure. It seems evident that the transnationalization of labor law bears many commonalities with the global reach of
corporate governance norms, in particular with regard to the hybridization of
the applicable rules into an intricate mixture of hard and soft law, of statutory
norms, and of self-regulatory regimes. At the same time, the concerns of labor
lawyers will continue to differ dramatically from those of today's corporate lawyers and corporate law scholars. The dire reality of contemporary labor law, embedded in a seemingly universal loss of terrain for both political leverage and
scholarly influence, testifies to the field's state of siege. As Douglas Branson
remarked,

21. Id. at 431.
22. HEPPLE, supra note 13, at 17. Contra MARTIN WOLF, WHY GLOBALIZATION WORKS 220-48
(2004).
23. ROGER BLANPAIN & MICHELE COLUCCI, THE GLOBALIZATION OF LABOUR STANDARDS: THE
SOFT LAW TRACK (2004); JILL MURRAY, CORPORATE CODES OF CONDUCT AND LABOUR STANDARDS,
http.//www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/telearn/globaL/ilo/guide/jill.htm (last visited Jan. 13,2006).
24. HEPPLE, sUpra note 13, at I I ("Behind the paper tigers of laws and codes of conduct, is the
thriving jungle of the market."). "Private corporate codes exist because of the absence of an enforceable internationally agreed labour regime." Id. at 72.
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Worker exploitation, degradation of the environment, economic
imperialism, regulatory arbitrage, and plantation production efforts by the growing stable of gargantuan multinationals, whose
power exceeds that of most nation states, is far higher on the glo25
bal agenda than is convergence in governance.
It is against these regimes' different prospects for the future that the inquiry
into the transnationalization of corporate and labor norms needs to be conceptualized. Hence, the study of what might be understood as an emerging transnationallaw ofcorporategovernance has to focus on the various existing regulatory
frameworks for business corporations on the domestic, transnational, and international level. Conceptualizing the norms that shape the "constitution of the
firm" as a transnationally evolving body of law 26 helps to illuminate the embeddedness of firms in layers of rules. 7 Business corporations and the norms that govern
them must be understood in the context of their origin and development in specific systems of production, 2 as well as in legal and socioeconomic cultures.29 The
transnational law of corporate governance encompasses the hard law that governs
the corporation through domestic company law, securities regulation, tax law, or
labor law, on the one hand, and the soft law of voluntary codes of conduct, corporate governance codes, human rights codes, and core labor standards, on the other.
25. Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain Prospectof "Global"Convergence in CorporateGov-

ernance, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 321, 326 (2001).
26. See CHRISTINE A. MALLIN, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ch.3 (2004).
27. See generally ANDREW SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM: THE CHANGING BALANCE OF PUBLIC
Rogers Hollingsworth, From NationalEmbeddedness
AND PRIVATE POWER (1965); Robert Boyer &J.
to Spatialand InstitutionalNestedness, in CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM: THE EMBEDDEDNESS OF INSTITUTIONS

433 (J.
Rogers Hollingsworth & Robert Boyer eds., 1997); Mark Granovetter, Economic

Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. Soc. 481 (1985); Peer Zumbansen, The Privatization of Corporate Law?: Corporate Governance Codes and Commercial Self-

Regulation, JURIDIKUM (ER.G.), Mar. 2002, at 32.
28. See

SANFORD M. JACOBY, THE EMBEDDED CORPORATION: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EM-

PLOYMENT RELATIONS IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

(2005); MICHAEL STORPER & ROBERT SALAIS,

WORLDS OF PRODUCTION: THE ACTION FRAMEWORKS OF THE ECONOMY

(1997).

29. See generally Richard Whitley, The Social Constructionof Economic Actors: Institutions and
Types of Firms in Europe and Other Market Economies, in THE CHANGING EUROPEAN FIRM 39
(Richard Whitley &Peer Hull Kristensen eds., 1996); RICHARD WHITLEY, DIVERGENT CAPITALISMS
(2d ed. 2000); Robert Boyer, Hybridization and Models of Production: Geography, History, and
Theory, in

23 (Robert Boyer et al.
eds., 1998); SYSTEMS OF
Burchell et al. eds., 2003). See
WEAK OWNERS (1994).

BETWEEN IMITATION AND INNOVATION

PRODUCTION: MARKETS, ORGANISATIONS AND PERFORMANCE (Brendan

also MARK J. ROE,

STRONG MANAGERS,
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As the latter present a dramatic challenge to traditional understandings of
law making, an analysis of voluntary codes of conduct further illuminates the
complex nature of the regulated and self-regulating firm. But the inquiry into
the transnationalization of corporate and labor norms reveals a much less natural or unavoidable development than is often thought. Instead of understanding
the new politics of labor as illuminating and assessing an inevitable development, quasi-naturally accompanying the globalization of commercial activity,
this process must be studied with much closer attention to the political constellations in which choices are made."° The move of legal analysis beyond the confines of the nation-state must incorporate the lessons learned from previous
studies of regulatory change in domestic welfare-state regimes, in order to ask
the right questions when confronted with the plethora of self-regulatory norms,
codes of best practice, codes of conduct, and core standards. In addition, the
comparative view on both corporate and labor law shall allow bridging some of
the bifurcations that characterize the commonly separated fields of law. While,
in labor law, a distinct critique of self-regulation and an erosion of enforceable
rights have been unfolding over the past few years, 31 the same cannot be said of
contemporary mainstream scholarship in the area of corporate law. Here, the
discourse seems to be predominantly determined by ongoing concerns with issues of "ownership and control" and an alleged convergence of corporate governance rules toward a shareholder-value maximization model. 3' After important
studies exploring the political economy of the corporation, 3 the focus on the

30. See Karl Klare, The Horizons of Tramformative Labour and Employment Law, in LABOUR

3 (Joanne Conaghan et al. eds., 2002); Joanne Conaghan,
Women, Work, and Family: A British Revolution?, inLABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION,
LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

supra, at 53.
31. See H.W. Arthurs, Labour Law without the State?, 46 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1996); Manfred
Weiss, The Futureof Comparative Labor Law as an Academic Disciplineand as a Practical Tool, 25
CoMP. LAB. L. & PoL'Y J. 169 (2003); Alston, Core Labour Standards,supra note 19; Philip Alston,

Labour Rights as Human Rights: The Not So Happy State of the Art, in LABOUR

RIGHTS AS HUMAN

(Philip Alston ed., 2005); Simon Deakin, Social Rights in a Globalized Economy, in LABOUR RIGHTS ASHUMAN RIGHTS, supra, at 25. But see Langille, supra note 19.
32. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of Historyfor CorporateLaw, 89
GEo. L.J. 439 (2001) (subsequently republished in different collections). For an early, quite vehement critique of the Hansmann & Kraakman article, see Branson,supra note 25, at 330-31 (calling
it a "chauvinistic statement of the Americanocentric convergence thesis").
33. WALTHER RATHENAU, VOM AKTINWESEN (1917); ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY
CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954); SHONFIELD, supra note 27.
RIGHTS I

270
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law-making aspects of corporate norms is much more recent.34 Only from this
perspective can we arrive at a more precise and adequate picture of the role of
law in shaping the constitution of the firm. Deciphering this role is important in
view of the manifold functions that today's firms perform on the domestic and
the transnational level. These functions of the firm include: the furthering of
prosperity for shareholders and stakeholders such as employees, creditors, and
the community at large; guaranteeing employee pension plans;35 investing in research and development; and disseminating resulting knowledge, as well as engaging in the protection of the environment or observing cultural requirements
and human rights standards in the firm's operation in various political contexts.
In addition, as firms offer themselves as prime agents of technological innovation, their role within regional and national economies is of utmost importance
under conditions of global competition. Noting a recently heightened awareness
among policy makers in Canada, the United States, and the European Union of
the need to strengthen the innovative potential of their economies, it is mandatory to better understand the role of business corporations and the potential for,
but also the shortcomings of, regulatory approaches in this respect.36
The first Part of this article explores the different genealogies and trajectories of corporate law and labor law as the two great, opposed building blocks of

34. Theodor Baums, Reforming German Corporate Governance:Inside a Law Making Process ofa
Very New Nature-Interviewwith ProfessorDr. TheodorBaums, GERMAN L.J., July 16, 2001, http.//
4
www.germanlawjournal.com/past-issues.php?id= 3; John W. Cioffi, Governing Globalization?
The State, Law, and Structural Change in CorporateGovernance, 27 J.L. & Soc'y 572 (2000); Zumbansen, supra note 27.
35. See Donald J.Johnston, Foreword to ORG. FOR EcoN. Co-OPERATION AND DEv., OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 3-4 (rev. ed. 2004), http.//www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/
31557724.pdf ("In today's economies, interest in corporate governance goes beyond that of shareholders in the performance of individual companies. As companies play a pivotal role in our economies and we rely increasingly on private sector institutions to manage personal savings and
secure retirement incomes, good corporate governance is important to broad and growing segments of the population.").
36. ORG. FOR EcoN. Co-OPERATION AND DEv., supra note 35, at 13-14 ("The Principles are evolutionary in nature and should be reviewed in light of significant changes in circumstances. To remain competitive in a changing world, corporations must innovate and adapt their corporate
governance practices so that they can meet new demands and grasp new opportunities. Similarly,
governments have an important responsibility for shaping an effective regulatory framework that
provides for sufficient flexibility to allow markets to function effectively and to respond to expectations of shareholders and other stakeholders.").
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the "political economy of the firm." 37 In the context of this article, the focus in
Part II.A. will be on the different regulatory foci of corporate and labor law and
their respective images and concepts of the corporation, its stakeholders, and its
role in society. This first comparison of the different worlds of corporate and
labor law serves as a prerequisite for the closer scrutiny of the changes in regulatory method that have been taking place in both fields. The changes in corporate
law, through the comparative study and impact of foreign corporate governance
rules and through the issuance of corporate governance recommendations and
standards through private and quasi-public bodies on the domestic and international level, have nurtured belief in a universal convergence of corporate governance rules. And yet, contestations remain strong. This is the focus of Part
II.B. of this article. The last Part explores the larger context of a turn to standards, recommendations, and corporate self-regulation against the background
of international law's long-standing soul-searching. 38 We enter ardent debates
over the viability of legal regulatory frameworks in an increasingly globalized
society.39 Whether it is possible to transport and translate our understanding and
experiences of the rule of law and "fora, forms and processes" of legal delibera-

37. See generally THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE COMPANY (J.E. Parkinson et al. eds., 2000).
The inquiry into the no less important political economy of taxation law in shaping the regulatory
environment of the firm will be pursued in a subsequent paper. See, e.g., Neil Brooks, The Logics,
Policyand Politicsof Tax Law, in MATERIALS ON

CANADIAN INCOME TAX LAW

(Tim Edgar et al. eds.,

12th ed., Carswell 2000).
38. On the ongoing introspection among international lawyers on their field, see Manley 0.
Hudson, The Prospectfor InternationalLaw in the Twentieth Century, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 419 (1925);
see also Martti Koskenniemi, InternationalLaw in Europe: Between Traditionand Renewal, 16 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 113 (2005).

39. See the breathtaking concluding chapter in

NIKLAS LUHMANN,

LAW AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM

(Ziegert Fatima Kasner et al. eds., Klaus A. Ziegert trans., 2004). See als-o Luhmann, supra note
18. More recently in this context, see Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain SearchforLegal Unity in the Fragmentationof Global Law, 25 MICH.J. INT'L L. 999,
1003 (2004) ("Neither doctrinal formulas of legal unity, nor the theoretical ideal of a norm hierarchy, nor the institutionalization of jurisdictional hierarchy provide an adequate means to avoid
such conflicts."). On the theme of a non-hierarchical, global legal order, see Peer Zumbansen,
Beyond Territoriality:The Case of TransnationalHuman Rights Litigation (Constitutionalism Web-Papers, ConWEB No. 4/2005), available at http://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/
SchoolofPoliticslnternationalStudiesandPhi osophy/FileStore/ConWEBFiles/Fi letoupload
16448,en.pdf. On Luhmann's concept of law as a globalizing social system, see Peer Zumbansen,
Notes on the FragilityofLaw: A Review Essay on Niklas Luhmann's Law as a Social System, 17 Soc. &
LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2006).
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tion 4' into the realms of disintegrated social activity goes to the heart of our reliance on law as a means of social regulation. But, instead of suggesting that the
turn to codes of conduct be read as the swan song of the rule of law, the concluding part highlights the stakes of corporate self-regulation and the rise of labor
standards in light of the fragility of rights and enforcement procedures in a complex and fragmented global society.
1. STUDYING CORPORATIONS, THEIR STAKEHOLDERS, AND THEIR

LAW

Corporate law and labor law inhabit two distinct and separate worlds of
legal thought-and of political reality. Corporate governance codes and corporate codes of conduct endorsing labor norms" mirror the existing tension inherent to different groups in the legal and economic fields. Both groups of actors are
protagonists in different narratives describing the reality of globally integrated
markets and the new economy. In one narrative, we find contract and property
considerations turning on management control. For corporate law, its primary
regulatory focus is on shareholder value. With regard to the regulatory context,
corporate law is embedded within a larger programmatic frame where structural considerations regarding the business corporation-"legal personality,
limited liability, transferable shares, delegated management ...and investor
ownership" 42-are perceived to be akin to policies focusing on investor protection, financial stability, and "good governance."4
In contrast, the labor law narrative illustrates an increasingly endangered
range of rights for workers and the need to adapt the applicable legal regime to
the economic realities that have come upon us.' As the economic environment
continues to change dramatically, allowing for a radical flexibility of capital and
40. Rudolf Wieth6lter, Materializationand Proceduralizationin Modern Law, in DILEMMAS OF
LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE 221 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1986).

41. See the excellent introduction on the ILO's website. Corporate Codes of Conduct, http'/
www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/telearn/global/ilo/code/main.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2006).
42. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What Is CorporateLaw?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 1 (2004).
43. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS

55-74 (2002), available at httpi/www.worldbank.org/wdr/2001/fulltext/ch3.pdf; Kerry Rittich,
The Future of Law and Development: Second GenerationReforms and the Incorporationof the Social,
26 MIcH.J. INT'L L. 199 (2004).

44. See the debate between Alston and Langille: Alston, Core Labour Standards, supra note 19;
Langille, supra note 19; Alston, Facing up,supra note 19.
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work, workers are threatened by the loss of many of their institutional and regulatory safeguards. Attempts to reinvigorate labor rights and worker protection
are hampered by international pressure to provide attractive economic environments. Where rights for workers are demanded by developing countries, these
nations fear yet another protectionist backlash from developed states.
It can be shown, however, that these narratives actually do not describe separate worlds but are instead two sides of the same coin. Both tell the story of
powerful changes in societal governance through law. Beyond the conflation of
different "models of democracy,"45 there exists a crucial parallel between the
regulatory challenges faced by public actors, such as states and international
bodies and the ever-growing freedoms of transnationally operating corporations. The transformations in governance brought about by the denationalization of societal activity, 46 by technological advances, and by an irreversible
interpenetration of public and private sites of power and identity, 47 are reproducing themselves in our debates over substance (What is the corporation?
Whose firm is it?) and procedure (How do norms come about? Are codes law?).
Central to both narratives are changes in their respective legal regime. But,
while these legal transformations can be understood as reacting to similar
challenges-the difficulty of extending nation-states' regulatory reach to foreign operating business organizations, a proliferation of norm-making actors
and levels, and a complex coexistence of hard law and soft law 48-there remains
a great need to further explore these transformations of legal regulation. While
labor law now needs to find its institutional and normative holding in globally
integrated markets and a drastically changed regulatory environment, corporate
governance seems to reflect the bright side of the recent new economy-here,
(2d ed. 1997); ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY (2000);
Three Normative Models of Democracy, in THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER 239
(Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De Greiffeds., 1998).
46. Seegenerally Luhmann,supra note 18; LUHMANN,SUpra note 39; SASKIA SASSEN, Globalization
orDenationalization?,10 REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 1 (2003).
47. Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Fieldas an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 L. & Soc'Y REV. 719 (1973); Sally Engle Merry, Anthropology, Law, and Transnational Processes, 21 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 357 (1992); Gunther Teubner, 'GlobalBukowina':
Legal Pluralismin the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3 (Gunther Teubner ed.,
1997); Peer Zumbansen, TransnationalLaw, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Jan Smits ed.,
forthcoming 2006).
48. See BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW, GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION (2002). In this vein, see Jean-Philippe Rob6, MultinationalEnterprises:The
Constitutionofa PluralisticLegal Order,in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE, supra note 47, at 45, 55.
45.
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everyone drives a BMW and concludes business deals over the Internet. The
perceived changes in norm production in corporate governance evoke an apparently altogether different and dissociated discourse on the chances and dynamics
of global markets from the narrative of the rise and fall of labor law.
In order to further illustrate the tension between the worlds of corporate
governance and labor law, I will sketch some significant elements of the political
economy of both fields and disciplines. Against this background, then, we can
discern fundamental problems of analogizing the rise of quasi-universal corporate governance concepts (such as shareholder-value maximization) with the
emergence of corporate codes of conduct and core labor standards. While the
former are representative of a far-reaching transformation of the rules pertaining to business organization in order to make business management more responsive to investor needs, the development of labor standards that depend on
their recognition by states and private corporate actors and of corporate codes of
conduct that remain enforceable only on a voluntary basis, reflects on the increasingly fragile standing of labor law in the global regulation of the economy.
The claim to fame of the corporate governance movement at the beginning of
the twenty-first century might be the flipside of the longstanding deterioration
of labor rights and an effective labor rights regime.
A. Exploring the Geography of the "Worlds" of CorporateGovernance
and Labor Law
1. Regulatory Framework
a. Corporate Governance
With regard to the policy program of corporate governance, we find an eternal struggle with the separation of "ownership and control." This is not a new
topic,49 but is one that has been powerfully exacerbated by the recent financial
scandals in the United States and elsewhere.5" The problem of the separation of
ownership and control boils down to more specific inquiries into corporate per-

49. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROP(rev. ed. 1968).
50. See generally Margaret M. Blair, Post-Enron Reflections on Comparative Corporate Governance, 14 J. INTEmRisc. ECON. 113 (2003); Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in CorporateLaw, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27 (2003).
ERrY
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sonality and limited liability,"1 managerial power, and minority protection. 2 In
light of related discussions, we can discern the "purpose" of the corporation to be
the generation of profit for shareholders." Control has always been a contested
concept, invoking countervailing conceptual approaches; control ought to be exercised either through internal organization or the market, inner-firm instruments of management supervision with or without independent directors, or
takeovers.54 While the latter clearly points to the embeddedness of corporate law
in a wider frame of regulatory politics and path-dependent corporate trajectories, 55 a microanalysis of corporate law remains restricted to an inside view of the
corporation. Corporate law remains confined to the "ownership and control"
model that is exclusively oriented around financial ownership. Human capital
investment, in contrast,56 is not considered on the same level as financial investment. Eventually, the combination of financial transparency goals promoted
and enforced by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), and the protection
of managerial prerogatives, led to a forceful exclusion of employees from the
American concept of corporate governance.57 Hence, all protective policies relating to investment regularly address the protection of the investor.
51. See the brilliant analysis by Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations:The Corporate
Personality Controvery and Comparative CorporateGovernance, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 583 (1999). For
a historical background and critique, see Paddy Ireland, Capitalism Without the Capitalist: The
Joint Stock Company Share and the Emergence ofthe Modern Doctrine of Separate CorporatePersonality, 17 J. LEGAL HIST. 41 (1996).
52. See generally A.J. BOYLE, MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS' REMEDIES (2002).
53. William Lazonick & Mary O'Sullivan, Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology for
Corporate Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABLE PROSPERITY 11 (William
Lazonick & Mary O'Sullivan eds., 2002).
54. See Ronald J. Gilson, The PoliticalEcology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizingthe Euro-

pean CorporateGovernanceEnvironment, in EUROPEAN

TAKEOVERS: LAW AND PRACTICE 49

Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1992).
55. Mark J. Roe, Path Dependence, Political Options, and Governance Systems, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS AND MATERIALS

(Klaus J.

COMPARATIVE

165, 167-68 (Klaus J. Hopt & Eddy Wymeersch

eds., 1997); see also Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in CorporateStructure in Germany, Japan,andthe
United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993).

56. See

MARGARET

M.

BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

57.

JOHN

W. CIOFFI,

(1995).

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM, REGULATORY POLITICS, AND THE FOUNDA-

9 (Comp. Res. in L. &Pol. Econ.,
Law Research Inst. Research Paper Series No. 6/2005,2005) ("The American corporate governance
regime embodies a complementary and mutually reinforcing relationship between the marketdriven financial system and a legalistic, transparency-based regulatory regime."),availableat http://
www.comparativeresearch.net/papers/CLPE Vol_01_No_01_RPS_06-Cioffi.pdf.
TIONS OF FINANCE CAPITALISM IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY

276

PEER ZUMBANSEN

With corporate law's mandate being driven and constantly refined by policy
makers, regulators, and scholars, as well as leaders of business and industry associations, large corporations, public policy institutions, and regulatory bodies
such as securities commissions, government commissions, and expert teams, as
well as international financial institutions that promote goals of "good governance," the primary focus remains on the improvement of corporate disclosure
and of more effective firm management."
A final observation on the regulatory program of corporate governance is
related to the world of corporate law scholarship and teaching.59 Corporate law
as it is presented in textbooks and classrooms will usually exclude labor law, and
hence, the employee. This, however, is owed less to an overriding sense of autonomy or even superiority as regards other fields than to the aim of corporate law
teachers for a clear doctrinal and theoretical focus. To give an example: Bruce
Welling writes in his influential casebook on Canadian corporate law: "[Slome
are outside the scope of 'corporate law' as such, having acquired a subspecialty
over the years.... Some groups are not recognized in general as having a role to
play in the corporation's government."' In Robert Clark's masterful book, we
find a clear reminder to his readers to include labor law in their research on corporations and corporate law.6 In contemporary writings, this diversity continues. In The Anatomy of Corporate Law, which has already become a leading
reference work for the study of corporate law, the authors recognize labor law
among other "non-corporate law constraints" imposed on companies. 2 Labor

58. See generally Layna Mosley, Attempting Global Standards: National Governments, InternationalFinance,and the IMFs Data Regime, 10 REV. INT'L POL. EcoN. 331 (2003).
59. See generally Brian R. Cheffins, The Trajectory of (CorporateLaw) Scholarship,63 CAMBRIDGE
L. J. 456 (2004).

60.
61.

51 (2d ed. 2001).
32 (1986) ("[E]ven if your aim is not to understand

BRUCE WELLING ET AL., CANADIAN CORPORATE LAW
ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW

all of law's effects on corporate activities but only to grasp the basic legal 'constitution' or make-up
of the modern corporation, you must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of labor
law.");see also DETLEV F. VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION LAW 11 (3d ed. 1989) (regretting the omission
of labor and contract law from the reach of corporate law studies in spite of the fact that creditors
and employees "may have a lasting and intimate relationship with the corporation"). A very careful assessment of the "dilemma" of the traditional definition of corporate law (to focus primarily
on business associations and their organizational structure) is given by FRIEDRICH KUBLER,
GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT 3-4 (5th ed. 1998); a similarly cautious identification of the reach of corporate law--droitdesaffaires-isgiven by YVES GUYON, DROIT DES AFFAIRES 1 (12th ed. 2003).
62. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 17 (2004).
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law, inthis description, is identified as a body of law "designed to serve objectives that are largely unrelated to the core characteristics of the corporate
form."63 In contrast, Simon Deakin, a British chaired corporate law professor
and world-renowned labor law scholar observes: "While labour law and corporate governance could once have been thought as discrete areas for analysis, it is
clear that this is no longer the case. The relationship between them has become
both complex and paradoxical."'
This divergence in approaches and perspectives continues throughout the
books written by corporate and labor law scholars, the journals they publish in, and
the conferences they attend.65 Within the academy and the law school's curriculum,
corporate law is seen in concert with courses and issues in securities regulation and
bankruptcy law, but not with labor law. Courses are not taught in reciprocal exchange of notes or literature, and students rarely take both-unless it is mandatory.
We are reminded of the late Abram Chayes' astute observation: "The concept of
Corporation has political, legal and social dimensions beyond the economic. But
the appropriate academic disciplines remain largely unconcerned."'
Before we widen this admittedly very narrow perspective to the regulatory
context, a few introductory remarks shall be permitted with regard to the regulatory program of labor law.
b. Labor Law
Labor law's overriding concern is the protection of employment and employees. Its focus is on the employment contract, workplace safety, working
hours, and minimum wages. Subsequently, its focus is on representation,
whether on the firm level ("works councils") or in the context of collective bargaining. The historical and institutional memory of representation and conflict
in labor law is long, and it clearly illuminates the painful trajectories of rights
discovery, protection, and erosion through the rise of the industrial revolution

63. Id.

64. Simon Deakin, Worker. Financeand Democracy, in THE FUTURE
BOB HEPPLE QC 79, 79 (Catherine Barnard et al. eds., 2004).

OF LABOUR LAW: LiBER

AMICORUM

65. Butsee, e.g., First International Conference of the Comparative Research in Law & Political
Economy Network at Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto, Ontario, Can. (Oct. 20-21, 2005),
http://www.comparativeresearch.net/main.php? page =events.php.
66. Abram Chayes, Introduction to JOHN P. DAvis, CORPORATIONS: A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN AND
DEVELOPMENT OF GREAT BUSINESS COMBINATIONS AND OF THEIR RELATION TO THE AUTHORITY OF
THE STATE,

at

i (1961).
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and its ramifications and successors. 67 In many accounts, labor law is today in
crisis, and it remains far from clear whether a revival is in sight. 68 At the same
time, labor law and workers' rights are slowly becoming part of larger corporate
social responsibility agendas.69 Much of this debate is concerned with placing the
corporation in a greater social context.7' Where a wider perspective on the business corporation is taken, labor law meets employee-ownership theories, as well
as stakeholder capitalism models. 7
2. The Regulatory Context of CorporateGovernance and Labor Law
a. CorporateGovernance
With a view to the regulatory context in which we explore the purportedly
separate worlds of corporate governance and labor law, we seek to trace the larger

trends of ideology that shape both fields. We find global conversations about "best
standards," universal norms, and a worldwide convergence toward one model of
67. See Achim Seifert, Das Recht derArbeitim Wandel. Paradigmendes Arbeitsvertiagsin der neueren
Geschichte des deutschenArbeitsrechts, in 5 HANNOVERSCHE SCHRIFTEN: TRANSFORMATION DER ARBEIT
153 (Detlev Claussen et al. eds., 2003); Harry W. Arthurs, Reinventing Labor Law for the Global
Economy: The Benjamin Aaron Lecture, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 271 (2001); Simon Deakin,
Contractof Employment:A Study in Legal Evolution, HIST. STUD. INDUS. REL., Spring 2001, at 1.
68. See generally Weiss, supra note 31. But see H.W. Arthurs, National Traditions in Labor Law
Scholarship:The Canadian Case, 23 CoMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 645 (2002). For one of the most promising studies for future work, see generally ALAIN SUPIOT ET AL., BEYOND EMPLOYMENT: CHANCES
WORK AND THE FuTUIRE OF LABOUR LAW IN EUROPE (English language ed., Pamela Meadows et
al. trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2001) (1999) (originally published in French, as AU-DEL, DE
IN

L'EMPLOI: TRANSFORMATION DU TRAVAIL ET DEVENIR DU DROIT DU TRAVAIL EN EUROPE: RAPPORT POUR

but rewritten in English to dispel "the impression that the analysis and diagnoses it contains apply mainly to France").
69. See, e.g., Wesley Cragg, Human Rights and Business Ethics:Fashioninga New Social Contract,
27 J. Bus. ETHICS 205,208 (2000); Andrew Gamble & Gavin Kelly, Shareholder Value and the Stakeholder Debate in the UK, 9 CORP. GOVERNANCE 110, 114 (2001); Steven R. Ratner, Corporationsand
Human Rights: A Theory ofLegal Responsibility, Ill YALE L.J. 443,531-33 (2001). For a very critical
stance, see H.J. Glasbeek, The CorporateSocial Responsibility Movement-The Latest in Maginot
Lines to Save Capitalism, 11 DALHOUSIE L.J. 363,366-67 (1988).
70. See generally Alston, Core Labour Standardi*,supra note 19; Alston, Facing up, supra note 19,
at 475-77; BLANPAIN & COLUCCI, supra note 23, at 111-17; Robert O'Brien, The Difficult Birth of a
Global LabourMovement, 7 REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 514 (2000).
71. See GREGORY K. Dow, GOVERNING THE FIRM: WORKERS' CONTROL IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
(2003); Paul Edwards et al., New Forms of Work Organizationin the Workplace: Transformative,Exploitative, or Limited and Controlled?,in WORK AND EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN THE HICH PERFORMANCE WORKPLACE 72 (Gregor Murray et al. eds., 2002); Teresa Ghilarducci et al., Labour's
ParadoxicalInterestsand the Evolution of CoiporateGovernance, 24 J.L. & Soc'Y 26 (1997).
LA COMMISSION DES COMMUNAUTES EUROPEENNES,
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corporate governance. Clearly, we are entering endgames of Hegelian dimensions
where we hear authors proclaiming the "end of history" with regard to the defeat
of communism 72 or the triumph of shareholder-value capitalism. 7 Central to
these discussions are national deadlocks over political conflicts resulting from
path-dependent institutional structures and trajectories.74 Thus, it comes as no
surprise that the existential differences between different corporate law regimes
75
are regularly presented as the decisive challenge to law reform.
Corporate law in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom is
overwhelmingly "enabling" law, with the state regulating only the framework
and leaving the rest of the internal governance regulation to the firm's constitutional statutes. 76 In contrast, while in the United States, Canada, and the United
Kingdom only securities law is mandatory and federally regulated law, we find
that company law regimes in Europe are much more regulated. For example, in
Germany, most of corporate law is mandatory, not enabling, law.77 As already
suggested in the introduction, however, the legislative framework of corporate
law has ceased to be determined by domestic policy alone. And while this has occurred for several decades 78 already, an even stronger push has taken place in the
last few years. The making of corporate law is no longer only a domestic process
72. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
73. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 32.
74. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, PoliticalFoundationsforSeparating Ownershipfrom Control, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES 113, 125-31 (Joseph A. McCahery et al. eds., 2002); see generally
Ronald Dore et al., Varieties of Capitalism in the Twentieth Century, OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y,
Winter 1999, at 102; Mark J. Roe, Commentary, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109
HARV. L. REV. 641, 643-44 (1996); Peer Zumbansen, European CorporateLaw and NationalDivergences: The Case of Takeover Regulation, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 867, 881-82 (2004).
75. See, e.g., RONALD DORE, STOCK MARKET CAPITALISM: WELFARE CAPITALISM 176-81 (2000).
76. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 42; Joseph A. McCahery, Introduction to THE GovERNANCE OF CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERSHIPS 1,4 (Joseph A. McCahery et al. eds., 2004) ("A
recurring theme in the literature concerns the role of mandatory rules in statutory standard forms.
In contrast with the United States, the trend in European corporate law has been to dismiss the
benefits associated with the enabling approach too quickly, relying on a narrow range of techniques and mandatory rules to balance the interests of the various parties.").
77. See Theodor Baums, CorporateGovernance in Germany--System and Recent Developments, in
ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 31 (Mats Isaksson & Rolf Skog eds., 1994). But see Theodor
Baums, Company Lau, Reform in Germany, 3 J. CORP. L. STUD. 181, 183 (2003) (discussing the
"comply or explain" principle).
78. See Clive M. Schmitthoff, The Futureof the European Company Law Scene, in THE HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW 3 (Clive M. Schmitthoffed., 1973); RICHARD M. BUXBAUM &
KLAUS J. HoPT, LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: CORPORATE AND CAPITAL
MARKET LAW HARMONIZATION POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE U.S.A. 167 (1988).
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but one that unfolds in a multilevel environment of legislatures providing binding rules (e.g., the U.S. Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002;' the refining listing rules for
foreign corporations on the NYSE;8 the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Corporate Governance Principles and the
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations;8' and numerous corporate
82
governance codes on the domestic, international, and transnational level ) and
nation-state governments either transposing such norms or complementing
them with further regulatory initiatives. This multilevel regulatory environment is characterized by a coexistence of soft norms generated by quasi-public
8 4
3
expert commissions, hard, statutory law, and by cross-national benchmarking
of standards and norms. It is in this context that the remarks by the EU Commissioner for the internal market, Charlie McCreevy, not to invest hopes in a
soon-to-come EU-wide Code of Corporate Governance but, instead, to promote
mutual learning and benchmarking, deserve particular attention:
Europe has a role to play. That role is to co-ordinate where possible Member States' efforts to improve corporate governance
practices, through changes in their national company law, securities law or in corporate governance codes. There are different traditions in different Member States and those should be respected,
but we must avoid unnecessary divergences which distort the single
market and make life difficult for investors. Member States want
and need to learn from each other's experience. The Corporate
Governance Forum brings together a vast amount of high-level
85
experience and expertise. It has a key strategic role to play.
79. 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 7201-7266.
80. Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Meansfor the Managementand Controlof the Modem Business
Corporation:Some InitialReflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1233 (2002).
81. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEv.,supra note 35; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND
DEV., THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (2000), available at httpi/
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf.
82. See generally MALLIN, supra note 26, ch. 3; European Corp. Governance Inst., Index of All
Codes, http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all-codes.php.
83. See, e.g., Baums, supranote 34.
84. Zumbansen, supra note 27, at 38.
85. Press Release, European Union, Corporate Governance: Commissioner McCreevy Outlines
His Views to European Forum (Jan. 20, 2005), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do? reference= IP/05/78& format=PDF&aged= l&language= EN&
guiLanguage=en.
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In a more recent speech, delivered on November 17, 2005, McCreevy
stressed the importance of this approach in light of the "different economic, social and legal traditions" among the EU Member States, even if he perceived a
"market-driven trend towards convergence in Europe." 86
Not everyone, however, shares this careful and open perspective. No less
than the "end of history" for corporate law was proclaimed,8 7 just before the financial scandals of Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and others became public.88 The
forceful and yet contested89 narrative of a worldwide turn to shareholder-value
based rules of corporate governance was brought forward in light of the still
vivid memories of the Takeover-High in the 1980s and 1990s, and the recovery
of the U.S. economy and its citizens' buying power in a dazzlingly triumphant
stock market. 9° At its core, this narrative contains a powerful endorsement of the
"outsider-control" model of corporate governance in which control is exercised
through independent directors and through the stock market's scrutiny of management behavior through the threat of takeovers. In contrast, the story clearly
marks as the losing party the "insider-model" of closely interconnected corporate holdings and seats on supervisory boards for financial institutions and industrial partners.9' The narrative has strong repercussions for the perception of
the firm and, with it, the legal apparatus that is of relevance to the firm. Its
86. Charlie McCreevy, European Comm'r for Internal Mkt. & Services, Future of the Company
Law Action Plan (Nov. 17,2005) ("There is no one-size-fits-all approach in corporate governance.
The Commission should continue to encourage 'best practices' to develop according to the demands of ever more integrated markets."), available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do ?re ference=SPEECH/05/702& format= HTML&aged =0&language=
EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited Dec. 23, 2005).
87. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 32.
88. For a brilliant analysis of the Enron financial scandal, see William W. Bratton, Enron and the
Dark Side of ShareholderValue, 76 TUL. L. REv. 1275 (2002).
89. See Branson,supranote 25; William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Comparative Corpo-

rate Governance and Barriersto Global Cross Reference, in

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES, supra

note 74, at 23, 24; cf Simon Deakin & Alan Hughes, Comparative CorporateGovernance:An InterdisciplinaryAgenda, 24 J.L. & Soc'Y 1, 5 (1997) (providing examples of nations that do not have
shareholder value-based models).
90. See NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE ARCHITECTURE OF MARKETS: AN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF TWENTYFIRST-CENTURY CAPITALIST SOCIETIES

147-53 (2001).

91. See W. Carl Kester, Governance, Contracting,and Investment Horizons: A Look at Japan and
Germany, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS: A COMPARISON OF THE U.S., JAPAN AND EUROPE 227, 240-41 (Donald H. Chew ed., 1997); Klaus J. Hopt,
The German Two-Tier Board (Aufsichtsrat):A German View on CorporateGovernance, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ESSAYS AND MATERIALS, supra note 55, at 3, 12.
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strong emphasis on investor protection, financial transparency, and marketbased control mechanisms increasingly shifts emphasis away from modes of internal corporate control.
1. Crisis, What Crisis?
This is a crucial development. In the debate on the negative side of the account it leaves only generalizing umbrella terms that are employed to identify,
but not explain, the insider-control model of corporate governance. The storyteller is thus inclined to forget certain characteristic features of the insider-control
model that would be worth pondering for a better understanding of the process
of corporate law evolution. The intimate relationship between corporate management and directors of lending institutions and CEOs of industrial partners in
a densely woven corporate network-while clearly inducing many of the
heavily criticized petrifying effects-clearly bears features of institutional stability and incremental growth. Among these forgotten features, we find long-term
financing and the possibility of synergies in future-oriented research and development and innovation among connected firms. Furthermore, we find elements
of variant forms of employee voice in the boardroom hidden under the insidercontrol terminology. Especially the latter has been declared as doomed, with regard to the inefficiencies associated with workers' participation in the boardroom and from the perspective of a property-rights-related assessment of the
shareholder-value oriented firm. It seems clear from the point of view of a shareholders-as-corporate-owners model that workers ought not to be given a say in
a corporate undertaking that is not theirs.92
This model, however, fails to conceive of the complexly structured entity of
the publicly held, large business corporation. It has long been convincingly argued
that a purely property-rights-based assessment of the corporation cannot adequately account for the role that is played by the corporation in society.93 From a
labor law point of view and, more particularly, from an interest-pluralism point
of view, the corporation's role is defined by the various social interests that come
92. See genoally Mary O'Sullivan, The Innovative Enteypriseand CorporateGovernance, 24 CAM393 (2000) (critiquing the shareholders-as-corporate-owners model); Paddy Ireland, Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership, 62 MoD. L. REV. 32 (1999) (providing
further critique of this model).
93. See FRANZ KLEIN, DIE NEUEREN ENTWICKLUNGEN IN VERFASSUNG UND RECHT DER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT (1904); RATHENAU,supra note 33; BERLE,supra note 33, at 18-19; Edward S. Mason,
Introduction to THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY I (Edward S. Mason ed., 1961).
BRIDGE J. ECON.
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together in its affairs. In this narrative, the corporation acts as a paradoxical instrument of domestication for powerful class conflicts. It is against this background
that we must read narratives of industrial relations, workers' participation, and
codetermination. These stories are, however, difficult to tell in times of economic
recession and ever-more revelations of dark stains on the vest of "Germany Inc."94
Most importantly, the volatile availability of global capital has induced an overwhelming pressure on corporate governance regimes worldwide to reform their
regulatory framework to accommodate the institutional investors' interests. In
that context, anything even remotely suspicious of protecting old-boys networks
and opaque financial holdings arouses severe critique. Washed away, however, in
this great spring cleaning, are ongoing attempts to further experiment with and
build on schemes of representation and workers' voices in the corporation. It is no
secret that the knowledge-based corporation is vitally dependent on the information input from its internal and external stakeholders (employees, research and
development, universities, and research centers).9" And yet, the current dominant
narrative of corporate governance reform remains more than hesitant toward
embracing more stakeholder-oriented assessments of the firm.96 Even less do we

94. See DORE,supra note 75, at 182-206. See generally MICHEL ALBERT, CAPITALISM VS. CAPITALISM (Paul Haviland trans., Four Walls Eight Windows 1993) (1991) (giving a very insightful account of Germany's particular corporate governance regime). CIOFFI, supra note 57, at 10 ("A
bank-centered financial system, networks of corporate cross-ownership, and interlocking boards
stabilized financial and ownership relations within and among firms, freeing management to
strategize for long-term growth. Strong labor unions and codetermination incorporated labor
into economic and corporate governance in ways that further encouraged long-term planning and
discouraged the pursuit of short-term financial returns. Overarching these arrangements, institutionalized bargaining among peak associations coordinated economic relations at the firm, sectoral, and national levels. The German corporate governance law channeled multiple contending
stakeholder interests into largely self-regulating, long-term bargaining relationships.").
95. See THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY: THE GROWING IMPACT OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE IN SOCIAL
RELATIONS (Gernot Bohme & Nico Stehr eds., 1986); BRUNO AMABLE ET AL., LES SYSTEMES D'INNOVATION A LERE DE LA GLOBALISATION

(1997);

MANAGEMENT IN EINER WELT DER GLOBALISIERUNG UND

al. eds.,
2002); Stefano Brusoni et al., Knowledge, Specialization, OrganizationalCoupling, and the Boundaries ofthe Fiin: Why Do FinsKnow More Than They Make?, 46 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 597 (2001).
96. See O'Sullivan,supra note 92.
DIVERSITXT: EUROPAISCHE UND NORDAMERIKANISCHE SICHTWEISEN (Werner Auer-Rizzi et
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find active endorsements of the firm as a complex environment of societal
97
experiment.
Instead, current preoccupations in corporate law focus on management discretion to adopt takeover defenses without shareholder approval," on voluntary
or legally mandated disclosure of management earnings,99 and on personal liability of company leaders for false information in securities markets.' The financial scandals in the United States and elsewhere have not only sharpened the
public's awareness of corporate greed but have more powerfully refreshed the
image of the corporation from a shareholder-value point of view. The corporate
governance crisis as a "crisis in confidence," which has been diagnosed since
2001 and has led to, among others, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of August 2002, is the
crisis as seen from within the shareholder-value paradigm. This crisis is an internal analysis of the law of corporate governance. And yet, the programs for crisis
management fail to illuminate the fundamental complexity of regulating the
firm as an innovative social actor.
In contrast, the corporate governance crisis as it is depicted by the erosion of
employee power in corporations (German Mitbestimmung, unionism in Europe,
the EU's Works Councils Directive,' in North America, the shifting weight
from collective bargaining to company level, flexibilized works council, "team

97. See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, "Corporate responsibility" als Problem der Unternehmensveifassung, 12 ZGR 34 (1983); Gunther Teubner, Enterprise Corporatism:New Industrial Policy and the
'Essence' of the Legal Person, 36 AM. J. COMp. L. 130 (1988); PEER ZUMBANSEN, INNOVATION UND
PFADABH.ANGIGKEIT. DAS RECHT DER UNTERNEHMENSVERFASSUNG IN DER WISSENSGESELLSCHAFT [INNOVATION AND PATH-DEPENDENCY: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FIRM IN THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY]

(forthcoming 2006).
98. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role ofa Target's Managementin
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Silja Maul & Athanasios Kouloridas,
The Takeover Bids Directive, 5 GERMAN L.J. 355 (2004), http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/
Vol05No04/PDFVol 05 No 04 355-366_PrivateMaulKouloridas.pdf.
99. See Martin J. Conyon & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock-Based Executive Compensation, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES, supra note 74, at 625, 640-41.
100. See Patrick S. Ryan, UnderstandingDirectorand 0fcer' Liability in Germanyfor Disemination of False Information: Perspectivesfiom an Outsider, 4 GERMAN L.J. 439 (2003), http://www.
germanlawjourna.com/pdf/VolO4NoO5/PDF Vol_04_No_05439-475_PrivateRyanComplete.pdf.
101. Council Directive 2002/18, 2002 O.J. (L 80) 29 (EC).
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production,"'' 2 etc." 3) is quite another. From the perspective of labor law, the
corporation continues to be in crisis not (only) because of the robbery of shareholders by management but (importantly also) because of the continued division
between the haves and have-nots."° Robert Dahl's famous-infamous comparison between political democracy and corporate democracy continues to haunt
the perennial strive for representation of employees within the corporation, a
struggle that has already been fought many decades ago under the heading of
"shareholder democracy" and the corporation as public actor. 5
It is this undisclosed multiplication of images of the corporation and of its
crisis that leads to the continued deadlocks in the untiring debate over the convergence of corporate governance standards. 6 Crisis, what crisis? Joel Bakan's
patient, the corporation,0 7 is, indeed, several patients in one. For Bakan, it is the
pathological pursuit of profit, with the crudeness of exploitation and profit seeking, signifying the sickness of the patient. For those lamenting the loss of confidence in the capital markets (President Bush, declaring in the spring of 2001 the
need for a yet unheard and unspecified corporate responsibility in contrast to the
much debated corporate social responsibility), it is the need to install truly independent directors to keep the watch over self-interested (sic!) managers. However, another patient is the firm as painted with the brushes of labor law: the
102. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of CorporateLaw, 85 VA. L.
REV. 247 (1999); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and Team Production in Post-CapitalitSociety, 24 J.
CORP. L. 869 (1999).
103. See, e.g., Paul Edwards et al.,supranote 71; EUROPAISCHE KOMMISSION, FINAL REPORT OF THE
GROUP OF EXPERTS ON EUROPEAN SYSTEMS OF WORKERS INVOLVEMENT (DAVIGNON REPORT) (1997);
Katharina Pistor, Codetermination:A Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalities, in EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 163 (Margaret Blair & Mark J. Roe eds., 1999); Rudiger
Krause, Sarbanes-Oxley Act und deutsche Mitbestimmung, WERTPAPIERMIrEILUNCEN IWM] 762
(2003); John Parkinson, Models of the Company and the Employment Relationship,41 BRIT. J. INDUS.
REL. 481

(2003).

104. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits ofLegal Change,
9 L. & Soc'y REV. 95 (1974).
105. See, e.g., RATHENAU, supra note 33. See Paddy Ireland, History, CriticalLegal Studies and the
Mysterious Disappearanceof Capitalism,65 MOD. L. REV. 120 (2002).
106. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward a Single Model of CorporateLaw?,
in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES, supra note 74, at 56; Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate
Governance: Convergence of Form or Function?,49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (2001); CARSTEN BERRAR,
DIE ENTWICKLUNG DER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN DEUTSCHLAND

(2001); MATHIAS M.
(2005).
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utopia of a just society produces many angels and demons, and it remains unclear into which category the corporation falls. But the hospital ward for labor
law patients is likely to be closed in the near future.
2. Discourseson Nature are Discourseson Form and Substance
The substantive debate over the "nature of the firm" ' imperceptibly moves
into the realm of law making when we discuss the law of corporate governance (or
of labor law) in the context of the increasing proliferation of codes of conduct.
However, the debate over the genesis and validity of soft law has been, as we will
see when we turn to current developments in the International Labour Organization (ILO) and in public international law, kept quite distinct from the substantive
debate over the corporation's role in society. This is surprising, as the fierce battle
over the public-private nature of codes of conduct, raised as regards their creation
and enforceability, is so obviously a mirror image of the public-private nature of
the corporation itself. But the "codes movement" is seen as a mere spin-off of a
larger trend of corporate law autonomization, weakening the tight grasp of political regulation as firms escape the nation-state's regulatory grip.
From the perspective of the corporation's stakeholders, corporate governance
codes can be understood as managing (or circumventing) the representation of
employees in supervisory committees, the size of supervisory committees, and the
frequency of meetings. Expanding this perspective, "good corporate governance,"
as understood by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and
the OECD, consists of optimal levels of investor protection through strict disclosure rules, effective control mechanisms, and the mitigation or elimination of
worker involvement in the running of the company.1"9 Good corporate governance becomes part of a more generally conceived measure of "good governance."
The worker who is lost in the current paradigm of corporate governance, however, is unlikely to be rediscovered in the "good governance" and structural adjustment programs put forward by international financial institutions." l It is

108. See generally Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
109. See WORLD

BANK,

supra note 43, at 58, 63-64; Arthurs, supra note 67, at 284-85;

KERRY

RITTICH, VULNERABILITY AT WORK: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN THE NEW ECONOMY: REPORT FOR

COMMISSION OF CANADA 26, 40-41 (2004), available at http://www.lcc.gc.ca/pdf/
rittich.pdf. For the context of such eroding labor rights, see RITTICH,SUpra, at 9-11.
110. See, e.g., Antony Anghie, InternationalFinancial Institutions, in THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 217 (Christian Reus-Smit ed., 2004); KERRY RITTICH, RECHARACTERIZING RESTRUCTHE LAW

TURING: LAW, DISTRIBUTION AND GENDER IN MARKET REFORM (2002).
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against this background that we need to take a closer look at the transformations
that define the current regulatory context of labor law.
b. Labor Law
Labor law's legislative and larger regulatory program has been defined by
statutory law, case law, and soft law of both transnational and domestic origin. As
regards labor law litigation, classically, we find examples of highly politicized adjudication, often greatly dependent on the presiding judges of highest labor
courts." 1 Labor law norms and rights are shaped through case law and statutory
law, but with the persisting difficulties of ratifying international labor law conventions by the ILO, founded in 1919, emphasis and hope for a more effective regulation of corporate conduct increasingly are being placed on corporate codes of
conduct and on transnational concepts such as "core labor rights." Like the law of
corporate governance, labor law has long come under the influence of transnational norms, the ILO conventions being among the most commonly known.
It can be said that transnational labor law evolves also where no explicit, formal ratification of norms has taken place in the Member States. This is owed to
the fact that labor law standards and policy considerations transgress geographical and political borders and thereby contribute to elements of what Harry
Arthurs referred to as a "Labour Law Without the State."" 2 This body or, more
accurately, this web of transnational norms and standards, consists of norms
generated by international organizations, such as the ILO, and of private norms
issued by corporate actors and interest organizations. 3 Labor norms included
in corporate codes of conduct raise dramatic questions as to the scope and limits
of protection that they offer."' This coexistence and overlapping of public and
private regulation, and of norm generation among states and private actors, illustrates what Philip Jessup coined "Transnational Law,"' 15 and what others
have identified as the "self-regulation of transnational civil society.""' 6
111. For example, in Germany, labor law's development is regularly attributed to the changing
presidents of the Federal Labor Court.
112. Arthurs, supra note 31.
113. See, e.g., Corporate Codes of Conduct, http://www.itcilo.it/english/actrav/telearn/global/ilo/
code/main.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2006).
114. Blackett, supra note 16; Harry Arthurs, Private Orderingand Workers' Rights in the Global
Economy: CorporateCodes of Conduct as a Regime ofLabour Market Regulation, in LABOUR LAW IN
AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 30, at 471.
115. PHILIP C. JEssUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956);see Zumbansen,supranote 47.
116. Rob ,supra note 48, at 45, 49.
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With the legislative nature and quality of the ILO thus remaining a challenge, it is worthwhile to reflect on the evolution and mandate of the ILO. The
ILO's history of attempts to create worldwide labor rights to protect workers
had already begun by the end of the nineteenth century. In fact, the ILO's very
creation gives strong testimony of institutional commitment and its drive toward international cooperation. The ILO's subsequent dramatic history reaches
a high point with the 1998 Declaration of the Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work (1998 Declaration) that proclaims four core principles: (1) freedom of association and effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining,
(2) protection against forced labor, (3) elimination of child labor, and (4) freedom
from discrimination. " 7 While the 1998 Declaration marks a long-needed institutional and theoretical reaction to the challenge presented to labor law, and its
norms and institutions through the rise of the network society and the knowledge-based global economy, 118 the 1998 Declaration marks, at the same time, a
veritable "constitutional moment" in international labor law." 9 The 1998 Declaration moves into bright light the long-standing challenges to the ILO's tripartite structure (states, employers, unions) in terms of effective negotiation and
enforcement of its norms-which can be done only by way of ratification. After
recalling the origins and founding principles of the organization, the 1998 Declaration states:
[A]ll Members, even if they have not ratified the Conventions in
question, have an obligation arising from the very fact of membership in the Organization to respect, to promote and to realize,
in good faith and in accordance with the Constitution, the principles concerning the fundamental rights which are the subject of
20
those Conventions.1

117. See ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, June 18, 1998, 37
I.L.M. 1233 (1998), available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/declaris/DECLARATIONWEB.
INDEXPAGE; Langille, supra note 19, at 415.
118. Arthurs, supra note 67.
119. See Francis Maupain, Revitalization Not Retreat: The Real Potentialof the 1998 ILO Declarationfor the Universal Protection of Workers' Rights, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 439, 441 (2005) ("[T]he Declaration is probably the most significant of the various normative developments that had taken
place over the last decade.").
120. ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,supra note 117.
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These four principles lie at the heart of the debate over the future prospects
of international labor law, but this debate touches upon the foundations of labor
21
law as such.1
As a consequence, the theme "Globalization and Labor Law" can be told as
two narratives: one is the story of exhaustion, the other the story of an emerging
new legal order. The story of exhaustion includes the creation of the ILO and its
long and often painful history of bringing opposing nations to the bargaining
table to sign conventions on workers' rights, which they then had to ratify in
their domestic parliaments. While the Cold War made for little progress in the
ILO, as the command and control structure in communist countries undermined the purpose of the ILO's unique tripartite structure, the ILO has been
facing another challenge in recent years. With a steady decline in union density
and relevance, unions might no longer be the adequate mouthpieces for a globally dispersed workforce. Meanwhile, the representative void is increasingly
claimed by NGOs, but the following concerns arise: (1) the ILO fears more
chaos for the already difficult negotiations, (2) the unions fear chaotic trends of
interest representation and that NGOs will import many heterogeneous issues
that are not altogether related to labor questions, while (3) the NGOs fear to give
up much of their institutional independence and autonomy when integrated
into the ILO's formal negotiation structure.
The second law-making-related narrative begins where the institutional
story of the ILO allegedly ends, and it is here where the problem lies. Very
briefly, the ILO's 1998 Declaration could mark a turning point for the organization, dispelling a lingering existence of often ineffective convention making
with few concrete results or effect. Through the 1998 Declaration, the ILO has
installed a multiparty monitoring and cooperation program, which is supposed
to create a powerful new solidarity program with a practically effective side to it:
countries shall work closely together when importing a convention into domestic law. As the agenda foresees a long-term engagement, it follows that the ILO
and respective nations will work closely together to find a solution adequate to
the actual conditions in a given country.

121. Alston, CoreLabourStandards,supra note 19; Langille,supra note 19; Alston, Facingup, supra
note 19.
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B. The PoliticalEconomy of Regulation
1. The Exhaustion of the State as Regulator
It is against this multilayered background that we need to reflect on the potential directions that law making in corporate governance and labor law might
take in the future. What is particularly striking about the developments in both
fields is their parallelism regarding the transformation of the forms of norm
generation, norm dissemination, and norm enforcement. In both fields, we see
the emergence of norms that are no longer generated only by officially recognized sources of law, but also by a multitude of domestic, foreign, and transnational norm producers. These soft norms constitute a radical challenge to the
state-based concept of law making that began to emerge in the nineteenth century and that Max Weber, among others, 122 has so powerfully captured as the rise
of "modern law. '123 In contrast to law originating in an official constitutional order, soft law encompasses norms that are not attributable to an official author of
statutory norms, and which do not appear directly enforceable by recognized,
traditional means for the execution and application of legal rules. Instead, the
soft law of both corporate governance and labor law (the latter being enshrined
particularly in corporate codes of conduct and in core labor standards) can be
read as reactions against incapacities on the part of the state to proceed with adequate legislation. The proliferation of soft law in corporate governance and in
labor law thus offers examples of what anthropologists and legal sociologists
have described as "legal pluralism. 1' 24 It consists of expert standards, best practices, recommendations, and principles, as well as standards, that can be seen to
inform ongoing searches for "better law" without due regard to political or geo-

122. See EUGEN

EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPALS OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW

10-23 (Walter L.

Moll trans., Harv. U. Press 1936) (1929).
123. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 880-92
(Ephraim Fischoffet al. trans., Bedminster Press 1968) (1914).
124. See Moore, supra note 47; HARRY W. ARTHURS, WITHOUT THE LAW: ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
AND LEGAL PLURALISM IN NINETEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND 50-88 (1988) (describing the persistence of legal pluralism in light of the ever stronger tendencies to centralize law through statutory
law and official courts); see generally John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?,24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1 (1986) (defining "legal pluralism"). For further assessments of legal pluralism, see Teubner, supra note 47, and Oren Perez, Normative Creativityand Global Legal Pluralism:
Reflections on the Democratic Critiqueof TransnationalLaw, IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD., Summer
2003, at 25.
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graphical borders. Jill Murray, a long-time expert on the ILO and on transnational labor law, powerfully captures this phenomenon:
There was a time when a student of labor law could expect to be
introduced to three elements of the discipline: the study of "us,"
the national labour law and institutions of the particular country
in which the course is located, the study of "them," comparative
studies of the national laws and institutions of other countries,
and the study of the "international," usually confined to a consideration of the role and function of the International Labour
Organisation (ILO).... Of course, beneath these comfortable divisions there was always a flow of influence and ideas about labour regulation both between national boundaries, and between
nation states and the international body. Although the study of
comparative law has become increasingly sophisticated, very little
has been said about these interconnections between the spheres of
"domestic" and "international" in relation to the regulation of labour relations. In any event, this implied clear division between
national and international, and the identity of these two spheres
on which the distinction was based, is no longer a central organis12 5
ing principle within the discipline of labor law.
Bob Hepple, a grand doyen of labor law, uses the term "privatising regulation" to describe the phenomenon of fragmented labor law norm creation.26
"The most striking feature of current attempts to build on the attempts of TNC
[transnational corporations] is fragmentation." 27 The proliferation of normgenerating institutions and entities has received extensive theoretical analysis in
the last three decades, 2 but much more must be done to further illuminate the
separate worlds of corporate governance codes and corporate codes of conduct
regarding, on the one hand, their common origin in strained regulatory powers

125. Jill Murray, Book Review, 30
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127. Id. at 69.
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of domestic and international legislators and, on the other, their apparently different political agenda.
The emergence of this unique and yet highly fragmented and decentralized
body of norms challenges our traditional state-based understanding of law making, and thus provides a common ground on which to assess the emergence of
privatized corporate law regimes, 129 corporate codes of conduct, and core labor
rights. That these forms of soft law in both fields cannot, however, betray their
stark differences with regard to their underlying policy agendas becomes clear
when we focus on their larger programmatic aspirations.
2. CorporateGovernance Codes
Corporate governance codes produced by national expert commissions or
other large, national entities such as industry associations or corporations often
embody condensed versions of the country's larger body of statutory norms
alongside recommendations that are intended to make corporate management
more responsible to investor interests. 3 ° While condensed norms are included in
codes to facilitate the navigation of foreign investors through a complex web of
applicable rules, the recommendations are usually meant to appeal to the management as regards the attainment of effective management practices, financial
transparency, and responsiveness to shareholder interests. 3 The formulation
and dissemination of corporate governance codes have dramatically increased
over the past ten years, and the reasons for this development are to be sought
particularly in the increased need for domestic corporations to attract foreign
capital flows. As financial flows became ever more volatile, flexible, and mobile,
the need for an increasingly investor-friendly regulatory environment began to
be acknowledged even where firm traditions of bank-based, long-term financing made domestic law and policy makers take a rather skeptical or defensive attitude. 3 2 Certainly, the emergence of corporate governance codes, as it speaks to
the increased frequency of supervisory board meetings or, to take another issue
that today is ardently disputed, the amount and the disclosure of management
129. Zumbansen,supra note 27.
130. See, e.g., Baums, supra note 34 (the "inside account" by the former chair of Germany's first
government commission to analyze the shortcomings in the existing corporate law rules and to
prepare recommendations directed at management and shareholders).
131. For an in-depth study of current corporate governance codes, see ZUMBANSEN,supra note 97.
132. See John W. Cioffi, Restructuring "Germany Inc.": The Politics of Corporate Governance Reform in Germany and the European Union, 24 L. & PoL'Y 355 (2002); CioFFI, supra note 57.
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earnings,1 33 must be seen as potentially powerful remedies against regulatory
deadlocks and blockades in bargaining games on the political floor. 134 In light of
long-standing lines of political confrontation with regard to key elements of corporate governance, the inclusion of recommendations and best practice guide35
lines in corporate governance codes might prove an effective tool.
But, there should also be no doubt as to the long-term consequences of this
form of soft law. One example shall suffice: the German corporate governance
code, prepared by a government commission of German lawyers, bankers, and
business experts, endorses separate preparatory meetings of the shareholder representatives on the supervisory board as best practice. The underlying justification
is that important decisions should be prepared among the shareholder representatives so as to be presented more convincingly to the employee representatives at
the official plenary meeting. The crux of the code's recommendation, however,
must be seen in the fact that such separate meetings have been practiced all along,
despite the persistence of the criticism that they effectively undermined the aims
of workers' codetermination in supervisory boards. With the inclusion of a recommendation of separate preparatory meetings in the code, this practice is effectively endorsed as an example of "good corporate governance."
3. CorporateCodes of Conduct
In contrast, corporate codes of conduct, while escaping any straightforward
attempt at definition, regularly contain a number of ethical standards for corporate officers' conduct with regard to the workforce (and usually the environ-

133. See generally Brian R. Cheffins, The Metamorphosisof "Germany Inc. ": The Case of Executive
Pay, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 497 (2002) (discussing the Americanization of corporate governance in
Germany); Alain Alcouffe & Christiane Alcouffe, Control and Executive Compensation in Large
French Companies,24 J.L. Soc'Y 85 (1997) (examining increases in executive pay in French firms);
LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JEssE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF ExECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (arguing for increased attention to the problem of excessive executive pay); see also Conyon & Murphy, supra note 99, at 625-46; For critiques, see William W.
Bratton, The Academic TournamentoverExecutive Compensation,93 CAL. L. REV. 1557 (2005) (book
review); James McConvill, Positive Corporate Governance and Its Implicationsfor Executive Compensation, 6 GERMAN L.J. 1777 (2005).
134. See MARTIN HOPNER, EUROPEAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM AND THE GERMAN PARTY
PARADOX (Max-Plank-Institut ftir Gesellschaftsforschung Discussion Paper 03/4, 2003), available
at http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/mpifg-dp/dp03-4.pdf.
135. For a discussion of the contribution of corporate governance codes to the (improved) selfregulation of corporations, see ZUMBANSEN,sUpra note 97, ch. 3.
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ment).'36 They too can be seen as emerging in the absence of tangible and
effective regulation for a dramatically deregulated workplace reality. And yet,
the emergence of corporate codes of conduct is driven by an actor, or a combination of actors, quite distinct from the one that informs the creation of corporate
governance codes. From one perspective, corporate codes of conduct could be
seen, in many ways, as the result of a unique form of public protest in a transnational civil society. The scandalizing of human rights abuses brought to attention by NGOs, social and political activists, or the press has drastically reduced
the distance between these events and an increasingly disturbed public in formerly faraway places. Consumer protest, public incrimination or the initiation
of protests, strikes by labor activists, and the branding of abusive corporate practices by various civil society members 3 7 seems to be the labor-law-related equivalent to the recently described phenomenon of an emerging transnational
38
human rights regime.
Strikingly, however, these parallels are not yet fully realized.1 39 Alongside
vivid attempts by international organizations such as the OECD and the ILO to
promote a more effective observance of fundamental employee rights by corporations, corporations have produced corporate codes of conduct that include nu136. Charles Sabel, Dara O'Rourke and Archon Fung have written several papers about corpo-
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Bank, Social Protection Discussion Paper Series No. 0011, 2000), available at http'/
siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion-papers/LaborMarket-DP/0011 .pdf; Charles Sabel et al., Ratcheting LaborStandards:How Open Competition Can
Save Ethical Sourcing, in VIsioNs OF ETHICAL SOURCING: A SERIES OF FREE VISION PAPERS (Raj
Thametheram ed. 2001), available at http://www2.law.columbia.eduI/sabel/papers/fintimes.pdf;
CHARLES SABEL ET AL., OPEN LABOR STANDARDS: TOWARD A SYSTEM OF ROLLING RULE REGULATION

(discussion paper for the Annual Meetings of the World Bank Seminar on
Labor Standards on Sept. 28, 1999), available at http'//www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/
ols.pdf. For a very insightful discussion of this proposal, see Adelle Blackett, Codes of Corporate
Conduct and the Labour Regulatory State in Developing Countries, in HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAW:
VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE, ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 121 (John J.
Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2004).
137. Robert Wai, Countering, Branding,Dealing: Using Economic and Social Rights in and Around
the InternationalTrade Regime, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 35, 73-76 (2003).
138. See Craig Scott & Robert Wai, TransnationalGovernance of CorporateConduct Through the
Migration of Human Rights Norms: The PotentialContributionof Transnational 'Private'Litigation,
in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 287 (Christian Joerges et al. eds., 2004);
Zumbansen,supra note 39.
139. "The international human rights movement has, until recently, paid relatively little attention to workers' rights." HEPPLE, SUpra note 13, at 21.
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merous pledges and voluntary commitments by the corporation to adhere to the
self-prescribed standards. 4 ' Their legal quality is hard to assess-they are as yet
considered nonlegal, unenforceable, and predominantly voluntary self-imposed
obligations.' 4' They raise important questions as to the scope of protection they
effectively offer and the larger regulatory trend in protecting labor rights that
they could be seen to drive forward. "Private corporate codes exist because of the
absence of an enforceable internationally agreed labour regime."' 4 2 Thus, while
it can be hoped that they attain some prominence through continued pressure
from civil society, as well as from such organizations as the ILO and the OECD,
which have undertaken extensive studies of numerous corporate codes of conduct, 43 a number of fundamental problems remain. As voluntary codes of conduct, they remain in the sole discretion of the corporation; they are often not the
product of a negotiation between employer and employees. 144 Crucially, perhaps,
corporate codes of conduct embrace company-level regulation of work-related
issues while often rejecting union involvement or other forms of organized
worker representation. As such, voluntary codes bear the danger of cutting the
ties between the worker and the outside system of institutional safeguards.
These last observations complement the already touched upon changes in
the regulatory framework of labor law. To cite Adelle Blackett,
Contemporary initiatives for setting soft law standards for labour
must take into account the specificity of labour regulation, at both
the national and international levels. Despite their apparent pragmatic potential to improve often deplorable conditions, such initiatives on labour are deeply called into question. Labour is a field
once largely filled by a dense combination of industrial relations
140. See, e.g.,

ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEv., THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

OECD

GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE FUNCTIONING OF NATIONAL CONTACT

(2002), availableat http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2002doc.nsf/ (follow "Reference Components" hyperlink; then click on the blue arrow to the left of "PAC (PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND
COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTORATE)"; then click on the blue arrow to the left of "PAC/
AFF/LMP"; then follow the "PAC/AFF/LMP(2002)10" hyperlink; and finally click on whichever flag-patterned document icon corresponds to your preferred language and document type).
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regulatory machinery at the domestic level, particularly in states
that espoused embedded liberalism, and a plethora of international labour standards, meant largely to guide the creation and
strengthening of state labour regulatory power.'45
The emergence of codes of conduct must thus be seen as part of what is a much
more complex phenomenon. Different attempts to define, categorize, and qualify corporate codes of conduct can only result in highlighting all those questions
that are connected to the issues of voluntariness, nonenforcement, minimum
standards, and self-commitment. To adequately unfold the many dimensions of
the phenomenon of private law making, we must reach beyond this straightforward, legalistic inquiry into the legal and nonlegal nature of voluntary codes.
Where we focus on soft law, core labor rights, and the alleged privatization of
the labor-law-making process, we are bound to take a decisively negative viewpoint on the contemporary regulatory landscape.'46 The alternative perspective
would be more realistic. 117 What this inquiry could lead to, eventually, would be
a renewal of those normative promises that informed labor law from its beginnings, while reconstructing them in view of the changes in the regulatory environment as they have been described. A juxtaposition of the allegedly private
vices of voluntary codes of conduct with the public virtues of an effectively functioning, protective labor law regime can be validated only in this regard. Where
it helps to initiate renewed deliberations over the protective scope of labor law
norms, instead of condemning all forms of soft law outright, the juxtaposition of
private and public ordering could allow us to illuminate the shortcomings and
preoccupations on both sides.
4. Public Versus PrivateRegulation: Can GlobalizationBe "Fair"?
In order to further assess the regulatory environment in which we see the
emergence of corporate codes of conduct, we need to widen the perspective still
more. In February 2004, the World Commission for the Social Dimension of
Globalization issued a 190-page report, "A Fair Globalization: Creating Oppor-

145. Blackett, supra note 136, at 121.
146. See Alston, Core Labour Standards, supra note 19, at 458; Philip Alston & James Heenan,
Shrinking the InternationalLabor Code: An Unintended Consequence of the 1998 ILO Declarationon
FundamentalPrinciplesand Rights at Work?, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 221,224 (2004).
147. See Langille,supra note 19, at 409-12.
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tunities for All."' 48 The Commission was initiated by the ILO in 2002 and produced a wide-ranging analysis as well as recommendations on globalization's
49
much-disputed "discontents," such as poverty, inequality, and exclusion.'
While the report embraces highly advanced ideas of decentralized law making
and responsive regulation, some authors recognize that risks lie in focusing on
the promotion of labor standards while decoupling this process from the existing
law-making and supervisory mechanisms in the ILO. 5 ' Their intention to instead preserve a strong role for the tripartite negotiation framework at the ILO
could invite equal amounts of critique and applause. The problem, however, lies
elsewhere. No adequate assessment of the regulatory models as suggested in the
Commission's report is possible when the substantive discussion over the need
for an effective labor law regime is decoupled from the wider range of regulatory changes that characterize the attempts to consolidate and protect rights of
workers in a globally integrated marketplace. Namely, seen in light of current
regulatory changes in labor law making that are defined by a seemingly irreversible trend to company level negotiation and minimum standards, the report's
authors went to great lengths in defining their approach to addressing the regulatory challenge that labor law faces today. The Commission can in fact be seen
as embracing a decentralized and highly diversified public-private policy mix.
As such, the report cannot be imagined without keeping in mind prior experiences with the United Nations Global Compact 5 ' and the more recent Draft
Norms on Human Rights Responsibilities for Transnational Corporations.52
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SASSEN, supra note 16; JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2002).
150. See generally Alston & Heenan, supra note 146.
151. The U.N. Global Compact was initiated in 1998 by U.N. Secretary General, Kofi Annan, to
create an international initiative that would bring companies together with U.N. agencies, labor,
and civil society to support universal environmental and social principles. See United Nations
Global Compact Home Page, http://www.unglobalcompact.org (last visited Jan. 13, 2006). For a
discussion, in particular, of its voluntary, non-binding nature, see Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to The Next Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 411-13
(2005).
152. See generally Carolin E Hillemanns, UN Norms on the Responsibilitiesof TransnationalCorporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 4 GERMAN L.J. 1065 (2003),
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol04Nol0/PDF Vol_04_No_ 10 1065-1080
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When compared to developments in regulatory regimes elsewhere, we are
increasingly able to understand the similarity between the rights protection regime in labor law and other areas of globalized law. 3 We find that problems of
procedure, norm generation, and enforcement must be seen in close connection
to the substantive area in which they are developed. It is only when these different dimensions are conflated that ideology can make us blind to the complexity
of the challenge.'54 Even the most dedicated labor lawyers express their positive
(or perhaps optimistic) expectations toward the current development in transnational labor law making. 5 ' But, they also point to the dramatic risks inherent
in this process: without long-term-oriented institution building, workers as vulnerable contract partners might before long become subjected to market forces
without any effective defense instruments to aid them.
5. Legal Rhetoric and the Move Awayfi'om Formalism
What remains crucial is the assessment of times and places when and where
a certain legal program is being promoted and the rhetoric that is being employed to that effect. Law making never takes place in a void. Instead, the tension that we can perceive in the area of international labor law between state
regulation and monitoring, on the one hand, and soft law, core labor rights, and
corporate self-regulation, on the other, can be seen as resonating with a much
larger trend in contemporary international legal thinking. As Martti Koskenniemi brilliantly argued, the current state of theorizing in international law-in
particular on the issue of humanitarian intervention and the "war against
terror"-is characterized by a "turn to ethics" and an ironic reversal of the normal and the exception."' We tend to disregard the normal and to take it as given,
natural, and ultimately neutral. Only the exception challenges us, and only in
mobilizing an ethical response to the perceived horrors of the world do we
proclaim universal standards and solidarity. We intervene in other countries
based on a very vaguely defined ethical agenda and thereby forget the everyday

153. For an explanation of globalization and its effect on administrative law, see Alfred C.

Aman, Jr., Administrative Lawfor a New Century, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 90
(Michael Taggart ed., 1997); ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT (2004).
154. For an exposition of the role of ideology in informing our description and mobilization of
legal regimes, see SUSAN MARKS, THE RIDDLE OF ALL CONSTITUTIONS 8-29 (2000).
155. See Weiss, supra note 31, at 177; Arthurs, supra note 67, at 285; Langille, supra note 19, at 437.
156. Martti Koskenniemi, 'The Lady Doth Protest Too Much': Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in InternationalLaw, 65 MOD. L. REV. 159, 160 (2002).
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injustice that has always been and to the continuance of which we greatly
157
contribute.
One finds it hard to dissociate this observation from assessments of the developments in international economic law, the WTO, the World Bank, and the IMF
In both general public international law and international economic law we appear to be facing erosions of formalism. 5 Instead, we find policy agendas that
cover macro- and microeconomic adjustment as conditions for funds and loans.'59
This development is largely principle and policy driven, and it functions-to a
large degree-without formal rules. Almost imperceptibly, the global marketplace begins to represent elements of a political "New World Order.""'6 But, while
its protagonists aspire to the transnational emergence of networks and civil society
bodies engaging in global deliberations,16 ' the new world order could elevate the
struggle over political values to an abstract level where decisions are taken over
liberal and non-liberal states, good states and rogue states. An ethical turn could
dissociate decision-making processes from any procedural critique of how this
process is composed and into which larger regimes of law creation, law enforcement, and power distribution it is embedded.
II.

THE EMERGENCE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

A. The TransnationalAdvantage
It is here that we need to contemplate the particular quality and role of law
in this process today. Our previous examination of the actors and decentralized
law making processes enables us to take a closer look at current forms of multilevel and multipolar regulatory governance. As suggested above, the norms that
157. The theme of law's violence is, of course, a very old one and one that is inherent to law. See
Douglas Hay, Time, Inequality,and LawS Violence, in LAw's VIoLENcE 141,141-73 (Austin Sarat &
Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992).
158. RITrTIcH,supra note 109, at 153-69.
159. Anghie,supra note 110, at 224. Seealso SrIGLIrz,supranote 149, at 27-28.
160. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
161. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at
183, 184 ("A new world order is emerging, with less fanfare but more substance than either the
liberal internationalist or new medievalist visions. The state is not disappearing, it is disaggregating into its separate, functionally distinct parts. These parts-courts, regulatory agencies, executives, and even legislatures-are networking with their counterparts abroad, creating a dense web
of relations that constitutes a new, transgovernmental order.").
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shape the constitution of the firm and those that form the body of labor law for
the worldwide activity of business corporations and their employees are transnational in nature. Although numerous accounts of the scope and content of
transnational law (TL) exist, the following sketch shall carve out the essential
ideas as they apply to our theme of the separate worlds of corporate governance
and labor law.
The first usage of the term TL continues to be disputed. While scholarship
focused on the origins of the term for a long time, it has since become apparent
that the real challenge of TL lies in its scope and conceptual aspiration. 6 Within
an interdisciplinary research agenda concerning the transformation of globalized law, TL offers itself as a supplementing and challenging category. Famously conceptualized in a series of lectures by Philip Jessup at Yale Law School
in 1956,163 TL "breaks the frames" (Teubner) of traditional thinking about interstate relationships by pointing to the myriad forms of border-crossing relations
among state and non-state actors.
Jessup writes that he "shall use ...the term 'transnational law' to include all
law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers. Both
public and private international law are included, as are other rules which do not
wholly fit into such standard categories."" When examining the inescapable
"problem" of people worldwide whose lives are "affected by rules," Jessup points
to the striking contingency by "which we attribute the label of 'law' to rules,
norms or customs that govern various situations." It is the hallmark of TL to
identify the hidden agendas and the blind spots of traditional regulatory law
understandings. These are marked by clear assignments of law-making authority to certain institutions and a clear view of which norms of societal guidance
are to be recognized as legal rules. In contrast, TL suggests a widening of the
law-making agenda and of our understanding of law as such. TL emerges from
the increasingly interlocking spheres of societal norm production by public, official and private, unofficial norm-setting agencies and actors.
Based on such an expanded understanding of law, TL has begun to reach
deep into the heart of contemporary struggles over the role of law within dispersed and fragmented spaces and places of norm production.' 15 TL reminds us
162. JEsSUP,supra note 115; Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, 75 NEB. L. REv. 181
(1996).
163. JEssuP,supranote 115.
164. Id. at 2.
165. For background on the distinction between spaces and places, see SAssEN, supra note 16.
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of the very fragility and unattainedness of law. At the beginning of the twentyfirst century, we are still at a loss to identify a theory of law that would be subtle
enough not to stifle emerging identities in a post-colonial era,"6 while providing
'forms, fora, and processes"'6 7 for the collision of discourses that mark postmetaphysical legal thinking.'6 8 It is against this background that our search continues for a legal theory that could adequately describe the complex regulatory
environment identified earlier.
The transnational perspective on law allows us to identify the dehierarchized law-making processes across national borders.'69 Building on Saskia
Sassen's and Sousa Santos's work on the importance of the study of places and
spaces of regulation,' 70 we can begin to discern the regulatory groundwork of
globally integrated markets. Seen through a governance lens that parallels both
the emerging governance structures and discourses on the national, transnational, and global level, the "domestic face of globalization" 7' becomes apparent, and "globalization" loses much of its supposedly foreign, "outside"
character. And it is through the realization of similarities of legal and political
struggles in other places that the shared place between those and our struggles
becomes visible. It is against this background that the study of corporate codes of
conduct may alert us to the challenges of empowering workers in fragmented
workplace realities that have been moved out of the reach of national regimes of
labor law protection.
The task, therefore, is to create a transnational regulatory framework which encourages and develops the potential of TNCs to
raise the labour standards of economically and socially disadvan166. See, e.g., Beth Lyon, Discourse in Development: A Post-Colonial Theory "Agenda" for the
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and CulturalRights Through the Post-ColonialLens,
10 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. PoL'Y & L. 535 (2003).
167. Wiethdlter, supra note 40.
168. Jijrgen Habermas, ParadigmsofLaw, 17 CARDozo L. REV. 771 (1996); JORCEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (Wil-

liam Rehg trans., 1996).
169. See JESSUP, supra note 115; Berthold Goldman, Frontidresdu droit et lex mercatoria, 9 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DE DROIT 177 (1964); Clive M. Schmitthoff, Nature and Evolution of the
Transnational Law of Commercial Transactions, in THE TRANSNATIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 19 (Norbert Horn &Clive M. Schmitthoffeds., 1982); Koh,supra note
162; Teubner, supra note 47; Zumbansen, supra note 47.
170. SASSEN, supra note 16; SANTOS, supra note 48.
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taged groups of workers and producers, particularly in the informal sector. At national level, the application and elaboration of
this framework has to take account of the specific local cultural,
social and economic features. We must, therefore, evaluate the
emerging methods of transnational labour regulation according
to their potential for the dissemination of "best practices" and for
developing solidarity between workers employed by TNCs in dif172
ferent countries.
TL thus illuminates the parallels between fragmented regulatory developments that no longer follow only the rules of state-based, statutory law making
and enforcement through courts. At the same time, the transnational law of
codes of conduct recalls the regulatory experiences within a specific, national
regulatory environment, which regularly consists of contested strands of law,
culture, and socioeconomic struggles.' 73 In this vein, TL contains the narratives
of law's past as it is embedded in national histories of law as an instrument of social change.' 74 TL, then, can be seen as always aspiring to form a stable body of
law, while it constantly unfolds as a regulatory experiment in a multipolar and
multilevel socioeconomic environment. In that respect, the study of TL can
sharpen our perception against the creation of allegedly "new rights," values,
and principles that are being presented as something different from the regulatory rules and statutes that legal theory has been concerned with all along.
TL offers itself as a critique of the promises of private ordering increasingly
detached from processes of legitimation and political accountability. From this
perspective, the transnational law of labor law rights is in its infancy. 175 For the
time being, corporate codes of conduct appear to move forward at best a reductionist and complementary concept of labor law, where workers' rights are subjected to a wider corporate agenda of social responsibility instead of being
developed within an effective regulatory framework of labor law. Meanwhile, in
avoiding effective political regulation through national governments or international bodies, corporate codes of conduct remain regulatory instruments not

172. HEPPLE,supra note 13, at 21.
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in the hands of those they are purportedly meant to protect but in the hands of
their corporate authors alone.
While the localized regulation of corporate activity echoes earlier hopes of
the advantages of decentralized governance in a wider system of regulatory
competition,' 76 corporate codes of conduct will not enable workers to develop a
sustainable regime of protected rights if they are not embedded in a sensitive and
adequately responsive system of monitoring and revision. It is here where the
spatial concept of public fora, organized in the vicinity of localized corporate activity, allows us to see the connections between different awareness initiatives by
consumer groups, political activists, lobbying groups, and non-governmental organizations. 17 7 From a methodological point of view, an effective supervision
and control of code production and of the rights they endorse will require continuous monitoring efforts. Proposals such as a "rolling rule regulation," by
Sabel, O'Rourke, and Fung, address the regulatory challenge that follows from
a highly dynamic and asymmetrically structured law-making process. 78 At the
same time, we need to assess the regulatory potential of such proposals in light of
the aforementioned importance of integrating prior regulatory experiences and
struggles over democratic governance into our contemporary design of a regulatory framework for labor law.
In light of these challenges of decentralized and fragmented public fora, the
political imagination undergoes dramatic adaptations. Consequently, the form
and substance of the political process need to be reconsidered in light of dramatically increased problems of representation and identity issues. 79 These must be
seen as both the burden and the heritage of the "global bukowina."'8 No "law
without the state" ought to be developed in a state of amnesia as regards the

176. See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.ECON. 416
(1956) (showing that spending at a local level meets the public need more effectively than spending at a national level).
177. HEPPLE, supra note 13, at 84, 273; Blackett, supra note 16, at 436-39 (discussing the differences among NGOs and the resulting difficulties for concerted action and effective workers' representation).
178. SABEL ET AL.,supra note 136. This approach has been working effectively in the transnational
law of consumer protection. GRALF-PETER CALLIESS, GRENZUBERSCHREITENDE VERBRAUCHERVERTRAGE [TRANSNATIONAL CONSUMER CONTRACTS] ch. 5 (forthcoming 2006).
179. Upendra Baxi, Voices of Suffering, FragmentedUniversality,and the Futureof Human Rights,
in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (Burns H. Weston & Stephen P Marks eds.,
1999).
180. Teubner, supra note 47.
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underlying and continuing distributive issues with which labor law has always
been concerned. 8 ' Accordingly, TL can help us recognize and assess pervasive
discourses of legitimacy of the new world order in different fields of law. For example, in the law of corporate governance, we see that the current assertion of a
globalized convergence to shareholder-value thinking tends to overlook many ex1 82
isting differences, even within different trajectories of capitalism.
The differentiated picture that has been sketched in this paper owes much
to the "Varieties of Capitalism" school, which has been casting a wider perspective on legal and socioeconomic institutions in order to better understand the
trajectories of institutional change in the political economy of states.' 83 With regard to labor laws, this perspective allows us a richer understanding of the regulatory environment: "[labor] laws are but one element of a wider political
economy that includes industrial relations, corporate governance, vocational
education and training, and inter-firm relations."' 84 And yet corporate governance, as it permeates the contemporary world of corporate self-regulation, is
entirely informed by a global focus on investor protection: the definition of the
business corporation, as much as the applicable laws, remains confined to a very
narrow concept and understanding of corporate governance without accounting
for the larger political economy in which both are embedded. It is here where
new comparative research has taken its cue from the "Varieties of Capitalism"
school while taking into account the "degree of recent political economic change
that has occurred in recent years and the intensely political processes that con' 85
struct corporate governance regimes."'
The decoupling of corporate self-regulation and the ensuing privatization
of labor law norm-setting standards seems to seriously frustrate any hopes of im-
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proving the ailing situation of labor law regulation."8 In light of the larger trend
toward deformalization in public international law, a (admittedly very) pessimistic reading would qualify any strengthening of labor rights and of workers'
participation in corporate governance as an exception to the norm, as something
to be ethically considered, if at all. Workers' rights would increasingly be seen as
excluded from the "normal" realm of labor law on the one side and from the
reach of corporate law on the other. Finally, as workers' rights become part of
the voluntary ethics codes of a corporation, there is the risk they fall outside the
reach of a more effectively enforceable regulation. In contrast, a more optimistic
reading that would focus on the potential of a continuing supervision by transnational civil society actors faces the above-described challenges of providing for
effectively linked, transnational monitoring and supervising instruments.
B. TransnationalLaw and Constitutionalization
"Law is important-but cannot be all there is, and it does not operate only in one way." 187
Some distance from the crystal palaces of transnational legal theory, survival
battles over the resistance of labor laws to neoliberal agendas of economic globalization are being waged, and these battles serve as a constant reminder of how
much depends on their outcome. In an angry article addressing the World Commission Report of February 2004 on the "Social Dimensions of Globalization,"
Philip Alston and James Heenan discerned an emerging trend in constitutional
thinking, which denies regulatory intervention.'88 It comes as no surprise that
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Lochner v. New York 89 in 1905 serves as the
case in point here, although notably and regrettably not Holmes's dissent. While
American politics and jurisprudence did in many ways take a critical stance to-
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ward Lochner in subsequent years, 90 this reversal seems to be forthcoming. Alston and Heenan fear that, in the wave of antiregulatory politics and nurtured
by an ideologically self-righteous neoliberal agenda, the Lochner Court might
now be seen to have promoted better "economic theory" when it interpreted the
due process clause as endorsing the principle of freedom of contract, something
that Holmes so powerfully deconstructed in his dissent. All is in the present, and
the past is forgotten. With it, all the lessons of the past seem to be forgotten as
well; the lessons from Holmes's dissent have powerfully and rightly been drawn,
for example, by the American realists, 9 ' but also by current work in law and
development.

91 2

In recalling the way in which Holmes deciphered the Court's embrace of abstract principles and its deduced legal rules from abstract principles, we can return to the wonderful story told by Felix Cohen about Rudolf von Jhering's
dream of being in a heaven of abstract notions.'93 In his dissent, Justice Holmes
convincingly pointed out that nothing can be seen as either being entailed or excluded by way of concrete outcomes from the recognition of rights in the abstract form. Rights, as such, are not a guarantee of either legal or social
transformation: it is only at the level of practice, typically in the context of a specific dispute, that their uses are determined.'94
The core of the debate over corporate codes of conduct must be discovered
in the underlying understanding of the law. This core is explosive, as it can again
be split. On the one hand, we find formalism, a discourse on "rights" and on law
as assigned power. On the other hand, we find the embeddedness of law. Here, we
find law as embedded in the greater political economy of its last battle against a
globalized corporate Moloch. But these distinctions betray their own impossibil-
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ity as well as their ideological motivation. Certainly, then, we find excitement
and unrest on both sides: Brian Langille, himself a long-standing expert on international labor law and the ILO, rejects Alston's lament that core labor rights
undermine the formerly endeared promise of global labor rights 9 ' as promoted
by the ILO as "romanticism" and "hallucination."' 96 Laws exist, Langille posits,
"not as ends in themselves but for the welfare of society." '97 True, but what does
that mean? Langille's argument, while being presented as forcefully as the one
he opposes, proceeds indirectly, making passes through neighboring territory to
show that one needs to take a wider view on things. The procession of the argument is simple, straightforward, and, at the same time, very sophisticated. It is,
indeed, both authors'-Alston's and Langille's-approach to the issue that will
likely make this dispute one that will retain currency in the discussion over the
ILO and the nature of the international labor law regime in the years to comenot to mention its value for a legal theory seminar on legal argumentation.
Countering Alston's concern about the ILO losing its influential position in
the shaping of an international labor law regime, Langille smartly responds, "I
have never heard anyone, inside the ILO or out, claim that the ILO was at centre
stage in any meaningful sense."' In this part of the argument we can recognize
the operation of elements of space.'99 For Alston, the ILO's loss of its important position in the space of labor law regulation is ascribed to its embrace ofneo-liberally
induced core labor rights that will, according to Alston, replace an allegedly more
effective system of rights protection under the auspices of the ILO in Geneva.2 °
Langille continues to operate in spatial imagery in order to identify Alston's very
premise as false. Rejecting the ILO's occupation of a central regulatory place and,
instead, situating the ILO at the margins of global market regulation, Langille
prepares the ground for his substantively more positive assessment of the ILO's
core labor rights program. Langille situates the ILO at some hard spot in the complex regulatory, multilevel environment of international labor law in order to further illuminate the regulatory challenge that the ILO faces.

195. See Alston, CoreLabour Standards,supra note 19.
196. Langille, supra note 19, at 417.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 418.
199. SASSEN,supra note 16, at 97; SANTOS,SUpra note 48. For an application in the area of corporate
codes of conduct, see Blackett,supra note 16. For a parallel perspective on the dce-centralized, spatial development of transnational corporate governance, see Zumbansen,supra note 16.
200. Alston, Core Labour Standards,supra note 19, at 458; Alston, Facing up,supra note 19, at 470.
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The idea that there is a centre stage and that it is located in Geneva
is probably a bad idea to start with. The international labor law
regime is probably, and probably always was, much better regarded as a very complex motley of actors, sites of contest, modes
of action, at different levels, etc., probably without a single centre
20 1
and shifting overtime.
In his reply, Alston sticks to the space and centrality perspective to reflect on the
importance of the ILO in shaping the international labor law regime-from
Geneva into the world through its manifold communications to national labor
22
law regulators.
From within the critique of the space imagery employed by Alston, Langille
moves to the legal core of the dispute over core labor rights. Where Alston suspects
that the ILO-through its 1998 Declaration-conducted a shift from rights to
principles, Langille interprets the ILO's embrace of principles ("freedoms") in its
Declaration as a clear sign for just the opposite movement, reading this as "a shift
from international labor standards to international labour/human rights. ' 20 3 Alston replies that the ILO and existing labor law retain enough rights and that "a
2°4
wide range of corporate and other actors need to be mobilized in that endeavor.
To this, Langille responds that, in fact, the ILO's embrace of standards and core
labor rights is not only in line with the ILO's traditional mode of norm setting, but
that the 1998 Declaration can also be seen as faring more successfully in the overall
implementation programs through Member States. 211 "The fact is that the techniques at the ILO were and are soft. '2 6 With conventions now encompassing
standards over long and detailed lists of rights to be ratified, the result is that the
newer conventions get overwhelmingly ratified. 0 7

201. Langille, supra note 19, at 419.
202. Alston, Facingup, supra note 19, at 469-70.
203. Langille, supra note 19, at 422.
204. Alston, Facingup, supra note 19, at 470.
205. "For labour lawyers this distinction between labour standards and labour rights is fundamental and sounds in the basic conceptual map that labour lawyers use to frame and justify their
field. This map is the basic story, narrative, framework of thought, call it what you will, which labour lawyers tell themselves, and it them, about what makes labour law labour law, and why it is
worth worrying about." Langille,supra note 19, at 428.
206. Id. at 423.
207. Id. at 425.
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In order to identify the problem posed by those suspicious that the introduction of human rights standards in the international labor law regime represents
merely an inside attack on the labor law regime, Langille builds on 20 8 the "'capability' theory" that Amartya Sen had developed in his book, Development as
Freedom.2 9 Applying Sen's approaches, Langille contemplates shifting the perspective in legal regulation: "Promotion is not a bad substitute for 'enforcement'." 1 The intriguing thrust of Langille's argument of promoting human
freedom is that the introduction of labor standards might help countries to reflect on what their real interest is in protecting and promoting human freedom.
And it is this task that others will hold them accountable for.211 When confronted, it turns out that both sides share more than was visible at first. Alston
points out that the core of the international human rights regime is not, and has
never been, about "enforcement. '2 -12 Instead, the main thrust of international
human rights is about "empowerment and mobilization." 213 With regard to the
ILO, this points in the direction of further institutional and procedural reform,
allowing the Organization to become more responsive and susceptible to "new
214
actors including corporations and those promulgating codes of conduct.
This multilevel and multipolar regulatory environment forms the framework in which we can observe the emergence of overlapping legal discourses
such as labor law and human rights, hard and soft law, or labor law and corporate governance. Shining through these discourses we may hope to find traces of
constitutional law with regard to determination of a new legitimacy basis for the
dramatic developments in regulatory governance. Constitutions easily become
fetishes, concepts of silencing, or overwhelming authority, as they embody
values and principles in a highly abstract manner. It is this tension, which

208. Id. at 432.

209. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM (1999). In his groundbreaking work, Amartya
Sen famously argued for an approach in development policy that emphasizes the growth and development of human capabilities to lead their lives according to their own disposition. While public policy would have to target such development, it should at the same time be influenced and
shaped by participatory input from those engaged in the developmental process. Id. at 18-20.
210. Langille,supra note 19, at 434.
211. Id. at 436.
212. Alston, Facingup, supra note 19. at 479.
213. Id. at 473.
214. Id. at 479.
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informs the contemporary assessments of constitutionalization of TL.215 But,
can we dismiss any thought of constitutional thinking when we are asked to reevaluate the boundaries of private laws with a public function? 216
It is one of the great legacies of the early beginnings of American legal realism to have argued that the dissociation of abstract principles from their real-life
application reifies the former, while providing no satisfactory explanation for
the latter. The isolation of constitutional values from their practice (Holmes)
leads us to forget (1) the institutional framework in which the constitution has
been interpreted and functioning all along, and (2) the distributive effects of the
legal and socioeconomic environment in which the constitution, or, for that matter, any other statute or norm has been interpreted. This means for core labor
standards that they too are not different from regulation; they are just another
form of regulation, and they have to be analyzed with the same analytical framework that we hold as adequate elsewhere.
Where self-regulation has the effect of placing workers at the mercy of
management without the availability of institutional safeguards, this form of
private ordering remains deficient. It is then not through the revival of traditional forms of collective bargaining, as were available in the post-war labor law
regimes, but through new modes of interest representation, monitoring, and the
securing of transparency that first steps toward the reestablishment of workers'
voice and participation may be taken. But, even while much seems to suggest
that we must turn our attention to the viable role that can be played by a wider
circle of interest groups, the break with prior existing forms of collective bargaining again becomes painfully evident. Indeed, where self-regulating multinational corporations and their codes of conduct can be seen to render the loss of
entitlement and participation rights invisible, corporate codes of conduct will remain unsatisfactory instruments of workers' empowerment.
Placing an abstract idea of market self-regulation in opposition to the idea of
state intervention makes either of these nonsensical. Furthermore, it assumes
they are something different. Yet, the market itself is not unregulated.1 7 Instead,
the market produces distributions of outcomes and power through the actors
and norms operating in it. The appeal of corporate social responsibility and of
215. See Teubner, supra note 47. For a critique, see David Schneiderman, Investment Rules andthe
New Constitutionalism,25 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 757 (2000).
216. See Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704
(1931).
217. See id.; POLANYI,supra note 11, at 71-80.
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labor norms incorporated in corporate codes of conduct can be seen in the fact
that they are commonly assumed to be neutral and "nonregulatory." By allegedly being mere principles instead of conflictual rights, they are not seen as impeding on the otherwise performed discretion of a market regulator.
Against this background, how can we describe an alternative vision of constitutionalizing the TL of corporate governance and of labor laws? Attaining a
more effective protection of workers' rights would take a courageous and yet
careful approach to multilevel, decentralized, and mixed public and private governance. Its approach would have to be courageous in its embrace of the exhaustion of traditional nation-state based or--on the international level-statebased regulatory institutional approaches in favor of context-sensitive models of
reflexive law and responsive regulation. At the same time, it would need to be
careful in remaining aware of the preceding and continuing political and social
struggles over participation, representation, entitlement, voice and exit, and,
eventually, loyalty. 21 s It would, furthermore, have to be careful and sensitive of
the continuing challenge in translating constitutional visions developed in a different regulatory and socioeconomic environment onto the transnational
level".2 9 This sensitivity would have to allow for awareness of the continuing tension between the daily, awfully quiet and routine practice of law, and its increasing moments of crisis, emergency, and exception. The development of a
constitutional dimension of TL would then perhaps allow us to remember that
at the outset of a decision for or against a regulatory option, there is always a normative dilemma. 22' That dilemma still exists regardless of which regulatory approach is resolved upon in the end. The undeniable dilemma-a dilemma that
lies at the heart of the debate over core labor rights and corporate codes of conduct, the "Trade and . . ." discussions, the struggle over the rule of law projects
of the World Bank, the policy recommendations by the IMF, and also of the
worldwide discussion over the alleged convergence of corporate governance systems towards a shareholder-value-oriented model all involve many questions.
218. See generally ALBERT
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These questions include: whether and which role workers are to play in the constitution of the firm; whether workers' financial, safety and organizational
rights must be seen in connection with the promotion of trade policy; whether financial stability as a policy requirement for international financial aid is meant
to include respect for a country's political choices for or against a strong welfare
system; or whether financial stability can only be achieved through politics of
privatization and deregulation.

